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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THOMAS D. HARRISON,
I Case No. 990659
Plaintiff/Appellant, ;
v.

]i Priority No. 15

RON DREITZLER and WERNER'S
MERCEDES REPAIR, INC.,

]

Defendants/Appellees.
BRIEF OF APPELLEES RON DREITZLER AND
WERNER'S MERCEDES REPAIR, INC.

Appeal from the Judgments of the Third Judicial District Court,
Salt Lake County, the Honorable Tyrone E. Medley, presiding,
District Court Case No. 98-0900524

I.
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
The Utah Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over
this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1996).
II.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Plaintiff/Appellant Thomas D. Harrison (Harrison) asserts in
his brief that this case presents three (3) issues for review.
1

See Appellant's Brief at 4-6.

Unfortunately, Harrison has not

framed the issues with any precision or clarity but
simplistically poses questions that challenge the trial court's
decisions in a general fashion.1

Defendants/Appellees Ron

Dreitzler (Dreitzler) and Werner's Mercedes Repair, Inc.,
(Werner's) can glean no arguments from Harrison's Brief directly
relating or cohesively analyzing the issues identified by
Harrison.

After re-reading Harrison's Brief several times,

counsel for Dreitzler and Werner's believe Harrison's issues on
appeal are as follows:
1.

Did the trial court correctly determine that Harrison's

First, Second and Third Causes of Action against Werner's should
be dismissed because Harrison never "traded" the 1987 Mercedes to
1. The issues identified by Harrison in his Brief, at page
4-5, are:
(1 of 3). Whether the Court's determination
that there is no genuine issue of a material
fact in this case is correct.
(2 of 3). Whether Appellees are entitled to
jeopardize Appellant's Rights of Due Process,
by filing with the Trial Court only one page
of Appellant's deposition, dated May 13,
1998, (R., p.314), which page was
demonstrated to be out of context with the
remainder of said deposition on the point of
whether the '87 Mercedes was a trade-in (See
Page 18 of this Brief, hereto).
(3 of 3). Whether Appellees are entitled to
"judgment as a matter of law."
2

Werner's?
Standard of review;

Entitlement to summary judgment is a

question of law with no deference accorded to the trial court's
determination of the issues presented.
one of correctness.

The standard of review is

However, this Court may affirm the trial

court's grant of summary judgment on any grounds available to the
trial court, even if it was not relied on below.

See, e.g.,

Hiqqins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993).
2.

Did the trial court correctly determine Harrison's

Fourth Cause of Action against Dreitzler for breach of an alleged
oral indemnification agreement was barred by the statute of
frauds?
Standard of review;

Entitlement to summary judgment is a

question of law, and no deference is due the trial court's
determination of the issues presented.
one of correctness.

The standard of review is

However, this Court may affirm the trial

court's grant of summary judgment on any grounds available to the
trial court, even if it was not relied on below.

See, e.g.,

Hiqqins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993).
3.

Were Harrison's due process rights violated by

Werner's' counsel filing only a portion of the transcript of

3

Harrison's deposition with the trial court?2
Standard of review;

This issue is a question of law and the

standard of review is one of correctness.

However, this Court

may affirm the trail court's grant of summary judgment on any
grounds available to the trial court, even if it was not relied
on below.

See, e.g., Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231,

235 (Utah 1993).
III.
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS, STATUTES
ORDINANCES AND RULES
Interpretation of the following rules will be determinative
of this case:
1.

Utah R. Civ. P. 32(a)(4)

- Use of Depositions in

Court Proceedings.
2.

Utah R. Civ. P. 56

-

Summary Judgment.

3.

Code of Judicial Administration Rule 4-502 - Discovery

Procedures in Civil Cases.
4.

Utah R. App. P. 9

5.

Utah R. App. P. 24

-

Docketing Statement.

- Briefs.

2. As discussed hereinbelow, Dreitzler and Werner's assert
this issue was not properly preserved below and should not be
considered on appeal. For clarity and the convenience of the
Court, however, the issue and standard of review are presented.
Further, because the portions of the deposition transcript in
question relate only to the trade-in issue asserted against
Werner's, this issue is inapplicable to Dreitzler.
4

Complete text of the above-referenced rules is provided in
Addendum A.
IV.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
AND DISPOSITION BELOW
1.

On January 16, 1998, Harrison filed his Complaint

asserting that he and Dreitzler entered into an oral
indemnification agreement whereby Dreitzler would repay a
$14,182.24 loan that was obtained by Harrison from Draper Bank.
Harrison acknowledged in his Complaint, at paragraph 5, that the
loan with Draper Bank was in his own name. (R. 1-6).
2.

On June 19, 1998, Harrison was granted leave to file

his Amended Complaint in which he asserted four (4) causes of
action. (R. 278-51).

The initial three (3) causes of action were

asserted solely against Werner's:
a.

Harrison's first cause of action (denominated as

"First Claim" in his Amended Complaint) alleges a claim for
overpayment, based upon his alleged trade-in of the 1987 Mercedes
(R. 228-30);
b.

Harrison's second cause of action (i.e., the "Second

Claim" in his Amended Complaint) alleges a claim for money had
and received, which is again based upon his alleged trade-in of
the 1987 Mercedes (R. 230);
5

c.

Harrison's third cause of action (i.e., the "Third

Claim" in his Amended Complaint) alleges a claim for overpayment,
based upon an "accounting" prepared by Harrison in which he
asserts the 1987 Mercedes was traded to Werner's (R. 230-31,
251).
d.

Harrison's Amended Complaint included a "Fourth

Claim" against Dreitzler in which he incorporated by reference
the allegations set forth in the original complaint regarding the
purported oral indemnification agreement and further asserts the
oral indemnification agreement is not within the statue of frauds
under the doctrine of part performance. (R. 231).
3.

On June 23, 1998, Dreitzler and Werner's answered

Harrison's Amended Complaint and Werner's asserted a counterclaim
against Harrison for unpaid sales taxes owing to Werner's. (R.
256-64).
4.

On June 25, 1998, Harrison filed a reply to the

counterclaim asserted by Werner's. (R. 287-88).
5.

On August 7, 1998, Judge Anne M. Stirba entered a

Scheduling Order establishing a Motion cut-off date of August 28,
1998, and setting oral argument regarding all pending Motions for
October 1, 1998. (R. 332-34).
6.

On August 28, 1998, both Dreitzler and Werner's timely

filed motions for summary judgment seeking dismissal of all
6

claims contained in Harrison's Amended Complaint•

(Motion and

Memorandum for Defendant Dreitzler, R. 345-68; Motion and
Memorandum for Defendant Werner's, R. 369-402).

Dreitzler sought

dismissal because any alleged oral indemnification agreement was
barred under the statute of frauds provisions contained in U.C.A.
25-5-4(1)&(2) (1998).

Werner's sought dismissal on the grounds

that the 1987 Mercedes was not traded to Werner's but was owned,
at all times, by Harrison.
7.

On September 8, 1998, Harrison filed his Memorandum in

Opposition to the Motions for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant
Dreitzler (R. 410-32) and Defendant Werner's (R. 440-56).
Harrison asserted a disputed issue of fact existed by virtue of
Harrison filing an Affidavit that contradicted his sworn
deposition testimony.
8.

On September 16, 1998, Dreitzler (R. 466-87)

and Werner's (R. 460-65) filed their Reply Memoranda asserting
that Harrison could not (through a self-serving affidavit) create
a disputed issue of fact.
9.

On October 1, 1998, Judge Tyrone E. Medley,3 heard oral

argument on all pending Motions, including Dreitzler's and
Werner's motions for summary judgment, and took those motions
3. Due to illness, Judge Stirba was unable to hear oral
argument. Judge Medley, without objection, heard oral argument
and, sua sponte, reassigned this case to himself. See R. 652.
7

under advisement. (R. 506).
10.

On October 29, 1998, Judge Medley issued his Minute

Entry granting Defendants' motions for summary judgment and
directing Defendants* counsel to prepare findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and an oirder for the court's signature. (R.
571-72).

A copy of Judge Medley's Minute Entry is set forth in

Addendum C.
11.

On February 22, 1999, Judge Medley signed and entered

the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and the Order granting
Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment that resulted from the
oral argument of October 1, 1998, and the Minute Entry dated
October 29, 1998. (R. 713-21).

A copy of the Findings and Order

are set forth, collectively, in Addendum D.
12.

On February 25, 1999, Dreitzler/Werners' counsel filed

and served upon Harrison's counsel a Notice of Entry of the
Court's Order Granting Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment,
Denying Defendant Dreitzler's Motion for Attorney's Fees, and
Denying Plaintiff's Motions in Limine. (R. 723-27).
13.

On March 3, 1999, Werner's filed a Motion for

Summary Judgment on its counterclaim, seeking a summary judgment
in the sum of $878.16 for unpaid sales taxes owed by Harrison.
(R. 729-36).
14.

On March 13, 1999, Harrison filed his Memorandum in
8

Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 73747).
15.

On March 17, 1999, and before a final order had been

entered as to all claims between the parties, Harrison improperly
filed a Notice of Appeal seeking appellate review by the Utah
Supreme Court. (R. 748-49).

That appeal was assigned case number

99-0255 SC (R. 765-66), and was subsequently dismissed by the
Utah Supreme Court (R. 790) pursuant to a stipulation whereby
Harrison paid Dreitzler and Werner's their attorney's fees in the
sum of $728.68 that resulted from that improper appeal. A copy
of that stipulation is attached hereto as Addendum F.
16.

On March 18, 1999, Defendant Werner's filed its Reply

Memorandum in further support of its Motion for Summary Judgment
on the Counterclaim.
17.

(R. 758-62).

On April 29, 1999, Judge Medley issued his Minute Entry

granting Defendant Werner's Motion for Summary Judgment on its
Counterclaim and again instructing counsel for Defendant to
prepare "Findings, Conclusions and an Order." (R. 782-84).

A

copy of Judge Medley's Minute Entry is set forth in Addendum E.
18.

On July 14, 1999, Judge Medley executed the Findings of

Fact and Conclusions of Law re: Defendant Werner's Mercedes
Repair, Inc.'s, Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion for
Attorney's Fees and the Order Granting Defendant Werner's
9

Mercedes Repair, Inc.'s, Motion for Summary Judgment, Denying
Werner's Motion for Attorney's Fees, and Judgment in Favor of
Werner's and Against Harrison in the sum of $728.68. (R. 795802).

That Judgment was entered on July 21, 1999. (R. 800).

Copies of the Findings and Order are set forth, collectively, in
Addendum G.
19.

On July 26, 1999, Harrison filed his second Notice of

Appeal again seeking appellate review by the Utah Supreme Court.
(R. 809).
20.

On August 3, 1999, Plaintiff filed his Docketing

Statement in which Harrison asserted he was appealing only the
trial court's award of summary judgment in favor of Werner's on
its counterclaim.

A copy of the Docketing Statement is set forth

at Addendum H.
21.

On August 25, 1999, this Appeal was transferred to the

Utah Court of Appeals by the Utah Supreme Court. (R. 824).
22.

On August 30, 1999, Plaintiff filed his Amended

Docketing Statement asserting that he also intended to appeal the
grant of summary judgment dismissing his claims against Werner's
and Dreitzler.

A copy of the Amended Docketing Statement is set

forth at Addendum I.
23.

On December 22, 1999, Appellant filed his brief in this

Appeal with the Utah Court of Appeals.
10

V.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In July of 1997, Harrison contacted Dreitzler about
purchasing a 1991 Mercedes SDL that was for sale by Werner's.
(R. 131). Harrison initially proposed to trade two (2) vehicles
he owned to Werner's: a 1987 Mercedes 300 SDL and a 1989 Dodge
Caravan.

(R. 131). When Dreitzler examined the 1987 Mercedes,

he determined that he was unwilling to take the 1987 Mercedes as
a trade-in because of the high mileage.

(R. 132). Dreitzler

then informed Harrison that Harrison would have to arrange his
own financing for the 1991 Mercedes.

(R. 132).

Harrison then obtained financing for the 1991 Mercedes
through Draper Bank and Trust (Draper Bank).

(R. 235-46).

Neither Werner's nor Dreitzler were parties or signatories to the
financing agreement with Draper Bank.

(R. 23-46).

The Draper

Bank loan was secured by the 1991 Mercedes purchased by Harrison
as well as the 1987 Mercedes already owned by Harrison.
239).

(R.

Incident to the Draper Bank loan, Harrison signed a Power

of Attorney in which he averred to Draper Bank that he was the
"bona fide registered owner" of the 1987 Mercedes.

(R. 243).

After Harrison obtained a loan from Draper Bank to purchase
the 1991 Mercedes, Dreitzler, on behalf of Werner's, identified
the 1987 Mercedes as a "trade-in" on the Motor Vehicles Contract
11

of Sale (Sales Agreement) so as to accommodate Harrison's
attempts to sell his 1987 Mercedes. (R. 132, 139-40).
the Sales Agreement is set forth in Addendum B.

A copy of

Specifically,

the reporting requirements for sales taxes do not require
reporting the sales taxes due on a trade-in until after three (3)
months from the date of the trade-in.

By identifying the 1987

Mercedes as a trade-in, Harrison would thus gain the benefit of
this three (3) month reporting period and could sell the 1987
Mercedes so as to pay the Draper Bank loan.

Further, Harrison

would avoid paying the sales taxes to the 1987 Mercedes because
those taxes would be owed by the prospective purchaser.

(R.

133).
Harrison admitted (in his deposition testimony) that the
written Sales Agreement, however, did not represent the entire
agreement of the parties.

(R. 373-74, 382). As of today's date,

the title to the 1987 Mercedes has never been transferred to
Werner's as would have been required for the vehicle to be traded
to Werner's.

(R. 374-75, 383). In fact, Draper Bank's loan

officer, one Patty Householder, acknowledged in her deposition
that Draper Bank did not view either Dreitzler or Werner's as
owning the 1987 Mercedes.

(R. 298, 319).

On October 31, 1997, nearly three (3) months after Harrison
claims the 1987 Mercedes was traded to Werner's, Harrison entered
12

into a modification agreement with Draper Bank concerning his
loan.

(R. 247-50).

The modification was to provide for monthly

payments but the loan remained secured, however, by both the 1991
Mercedes and the 1987 Mercedes.

(R. 250). Draper Bank did not

require Werner's or Dreitzler to sign or guarantee payment of the
loan because neither owned the vehicle.

(R. 247-250).

In December, 1997, Dreitzler first discovered that Harrison
had never had the 1987 Mercedes titled in Harrison's name.
139).

(R.

As a result, Dreitzler then informed Harrison that

Werner's would no longer accommodate Harrison in his efforts to
attempt to sell the 1987 Mercedes on Werner's lot and Dreitzler
delivered the vehicle to Draper Bank as lien holder.

(R. 139-

40).
VI.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The trial court correctly determined that there was no
genuine issue of material fact and that Dreitzler and Werner's
were entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

In this appeal,

Harrison claims there is a genuine and disputed issue of material
fact concerning whether his 1987 Mercedes was traded to Werner's.
All of the evidence before the trial court, including Harrison's
own deposition testimony, was that the 1987 Mercedes was never
traded by Harrison to Werner's because title never passed to
13

Werner's.

Harrison's own deposition testimony, in fact, was that

the title to the 1987 Mercedes was never transferred to Werner's
as it would have been had the vehicle actually been traded to
Werner's.

The only evidence to the contrary were Harrison's

self-serving affidavits, filed after he understood the affect of
his deposition testimony, in which he boldly asserted that the
1987 Mercedes was traded to Werner's. As a matter of law,
Harrison's affidavits are insufficient to contradict his
deposition testimony and he cannot use his own inconsistent
testimony to "create" a disputed issue of material fact.
Harrison's due process arguments are non-meritorious for
several reasons.

First, Harrison never made this argument before

the trial court.

Second, Harrison failed to preserve the issue

on appeal.

The issue was not included in either his Docketing

Statement or his Amended Docketing Statement.

Third, Harrison

has not cited any legal precedent supporting his contention that
Werner's was required to file Harrison's entire deposition
transcript, or that the failure to do violated his due process
rights.

In fact, Utah law is to the contrary, and if Harrison

had wanted other portions of his deposition testimony before the
trail court, he had every opportunity to present them.
Finally, Harrison's brief is inadequate under Rule 24 and
his failure to provide this Court with any reasonable means to
14

review the trial court's orders should result in those orders
being affirmed with an award of attorney's fees to Dreitzler and
Werner's on appeal,

Harrison has presented no legal authority or

analysis whatsoever in support of either his due process claim or
his oral indemnification claim.

As to the "trade-in" issue,

Harrison has provided five (5) pages of quotations from Utah
cases without any analysis of the law included therein or any
application of the law to the facts of this case.

Simply stated,

Harrison's brief does not present any thoughtful or rational
arguments that can be responded to in any fashion and his Brief
should be wholly disregarded.
VII.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY
DETERMINED THAT THERE WAS NO
GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT AND
THAT WERNER'S WAS ENTITLED TO
JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW
A,

Harrison Never Traded the 1987 Mercedes to Werner's.

In dismissing Harrison's First, Second and Third Causes of
Action against Werner's, the trial court correctly determined
that the 1987 Mercedes had never, as a matter of law, been traded

15

to Werner's,4

Even though Judge Medley issued Findings of Fact,

he did not thereby create a genuine issue as to any material fact
in so doing.5

A review of the proceedings demonstrates Judge

Medley's ruling is supported by the record.
First, Harrison's own deposition testimony was
that a transfer of title was necessary to effect a change in
ownership of a vehicle and Harrison acknowledged that he never
transferred title to the 1987 Mercedes to Werner's.

(R. 374-75).

Second, Harrison's actions after the date he claims the 1987

4. The specific Conclusion of Law Harrison appears to be
challenging on appeal is found at R. 718.
5. At oral argument, Harrison's counsel objected to the
trial court's decision to prepare findings of fact and conclusion
of law. (R. 833 at page 4, lines 13-17). In response, the trial
court noted that it is often "necessary to come to some decision
regarding the facts, especially in terms of whether or not
genuine issues of material fact have been established." (R. 823
at page 5, lines 1-4). Although Harrison's brief does not appear
to have raised this issue, Dreitzler and Werner's point out that
the trial court did not err in this regard: Rule 52(a) provides
that findings of fact are not required in ruling on a motion for
summary judgment, but a trial court's decision to do so is not
necessarily error. See, e.g., Salt Lake County Commission v.
Salt Lake County Attorney, 985 P.2d 899, 902-03 (Utah 1999)
(noting that trial court's decision to prepare finding of fact
and conclusions of law in ruling on Motion for Summary Judgment
was not error). Findings of Fact are only inappropriate in
ruling on a motion for summary judgment when the contents of
those findings of fact "evidence the existence of material issues
of fact." Mountain State Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Atkin,
Wright & Miles, 681 P.2d 1258, 1261 (Utah 1984). In this case,
the trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
demonstrated that there are no genuine issues of material fact
and were designed to simplify.
16

Mercedes was traded demonstrate that he always remained the
owner: nearly three (3) months after the alleged "trade-in,"
Harrison entered into a Change in Terms Agreement with Draper
Bank on his loan that was secured by the 1987 Mercedes he claims
was traded to Werner's (R. 397-98).

Third, Harrison executed a

Power of Attorney averring he was the "bona fide" owner of the
1987 Mercedes.

(R. 243). Fourth, Ms. Householder with Draper

Bank acknowledged that Draper Bank viewed Harrison (at all times)
as the owner of the 1987 Mercedes.

(R. 298). The record

evidence is thus overwhelming that the 1987 Mercedes was never
traded to Werner's.

Instead, Harrison remained its owner at all

times.
The only potential support in the record for Harrison's
position is as follows:
First, the 1987 Mercedes was identified in the Sales
Agreement under the heading "Trade-In and/or Other Credits," (R.
6).

It is conceded by Harrison, however, that the Sales

Agreement did not represent the parties' complete agreement, and
the trial court therefore properly examined other evidence to
determine the parties' agreement (R. 373-74, 382; R. 716, 718).
Appellant's brief does not appear to challenge or dispute this
issue on appeal.
Second, the only other evidence in the record that
17

the 1987 Mercedes was traded to Werner's are the multiple, selfserving affidavits of Harrison in which he simply asserts the
1987 Mercedes was a "trade-in."

(See R. 412, 441, and 443).

Harrison cannot, however, as a matter of law, use his own
affidavit to contradict his own sworn deposition testimony and
thereby create a "genuine issue of material fact" so as to defeat
Werner's motions for summary judgment:
[W]hen a party takes a clear position in a
deposition, that is not modified on crossexamination, he may not thereafter raise an
issue of fact by his own affidavit which
contradicts his deposition, unless he can
provide an explanation of the discrepancy.
Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170, 1172-73 (Utah 1983).

No

explanation has ever been offered by Harrison reconciling his
deposition testimony and his contradictory affidavits.

Without

such explanation, Harrison's affidavits were correctly rejected
by the trial court.
page 27, line 2.6

See R. 447, R. 832 at page 26, line 7, to

The trial court thus correctly determined the

1987 Mercedes had never been traded to Werner's and the trial

6. Harrison has failed to provide this Court with a
complete transcript regarding the alleged "factual" dispute. The
portions of the transcript Harrison did provide, however, make it
clear that Harrison's counsel did not make any argument the trial
court found persuasive (See R. 832 at page 27, line 3, to page
30, line 6), because counsel even agreed with Judge Medley that
the face of the Sales Agreement was the only evidence before the
trial court in support of Harrison's position. See R. 832 at
page 30, lines 4-6.
18

court's orders should be affirmed.
B.
Because There Was No Genuine Issue of Material Fact,
Werner's Was Entitled to Judgment as a Matter of Law.
On appeal, Harrison has only argued that there is one
genuine issue of material fact: whether the 1987 Mercedes was
traded to Werner's.

Harrison's brief thus implicitly concedes,

by providing no argument or analysis of the issue, that Werner's
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law if the trade-in issue
is resolved in Werner's favor.

Moreover, Harrison was left with

no choice but to concede this position: if the 1987 Mercedes was
never traded to Werner's but remained Harrison's property at all
times, there is no legal basis for Harrison to argue that
Werner's should repay a loan in Harrison's name and which is
secured by two (2) vehicles owned by Harrison.
Because Harrison has provided this Court with no legal or
factual basis for reversing the trial court's decision, the trial
court's decision must be affirmed once this Court determines that
the trial court correctly determined no genuine issue as to any
material fact existed regarding the alleged trade-in of the 1987
Mercedes.
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II.
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED
HARRISON'S ORAL INDEMNIFICATION
CLAIM AGAINST DREITZLER BECAUSE THE
SAME IS BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF
FRAUDS
In granting Dreitzler's Motion for Summary Judgment, the
Court concluded that Harrison's oral indemnification claim
against Dreitzler was barred by the Statute of Frauds, to-wit:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
As to Defendant Dreitzler's Motion for Summary
Judgment:
1. Plaintifffs claim alleging an oral
agreement to indemnify is barred by the
statue of frauds. Specifically, the claim is
barred by Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-4(2) (1998),
which applies to any "promise to answer for
the debt, default, or miscarriage of another"
and by § 25-5-4(1) (1998), which applies to
"every agreement that by its terms is not to
be performed within one year." Further,
plaintiff's claim is not taken out of the
statute of frauds by any part performance for
two reasons. First, the part performance
doctrine is only available where the statute
of frauds is asserted as a defense in a
specific performance action involving real
property or unique personality. Second, even
if the doctrine of part performance were
available to plaintiff, plaintiff has not
provided the Court with clear and convincing
evidence showing that any alleged part
performance is exclusively referable to the
alleged oral agreement.
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law re: Defendants' Motions
for Summary Judgment at R. 717.

See Addendum D.
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In his Brief on appeal, Harrison has not specifically
challenged the Court's conclusion with any argument demonstrating
that the alleged "oral indemnification" claim is taken out of the
statute of frauds by part performance or otherwise.

Further,

Harrison has even failed to cite the applicable statutory
provisions governing this issue and has cited no legal authority
that would justify reversal of the trial court's determination.
Absent any facts or law upon which this Court can perform a
rudimentary analysis of Harrison's claims, this Court is
therefore obligated to affirm the trial court's granting of
summary judgement in favor of Dreitzler.

See Smith v. Smith,

1999 UT App 370, 1 10, 784 Utah Adv. Rep. 30.
III.
HARRISON'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS WERE
NOT VIOLATED BY THE TRIAL COURT'S
CONSIDERATION OF A PORTION OF HIS
DEPOSITION TESTIMONY
A.

Harrison Failed to Preserve this Issue for Appeal.

In his brief, Harrison includes a subsection identifying
where the record allegedly shows that issues were preserved in
the trial court. As to the due process issue, however, Harrison
cites to "Pages 13-21 of this Brief, hereto," conceding that the
issue was not, in fact, preserved for appeal in the trial court.
See Appellant's Brief at 6.

In fact, the opposite is true:

Harrison had several opportunities to raise this issue at the
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trial court and chose not to do so.
On August 28, 1998, Werner's Mercedes Repair, Inc., filed
its Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 369-71) and the supporting
Memorandum of Points and Authorities (R. 372-402).

In the

Memorandum of Points and Authorities, Werner's quoted Harrison's
deposition testimony that the vehicle in question had not been
traded to Werner's (R. 374-75) and provided the Court with the
relevant portion of the deposition transcript (R. 383).
Harrison filed his Memorandum of Points and Authorities in
Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment by Defendant Werner's
Mercedes Repair, Inc., on September 8, 1998 (R. 440-56).

In that

Memorandum, Harrison argued that the vehicle was, in fact, traded
to Werner's but did not dispute Werner's presentation of the
deposition testimony; he did not object or present the trial
court with additional portions of his deposition testimony; and
he did not argue that additional portions of his testimony should
be considered.7
Harrison also failed to preserve the issue at oral argument
on Werner's Motion for Summary Judgment on October 1, 1998.
Although Harrison only provided this Court with a partial
7. It should be noted that in a different memorandum filed
the same day, Harrison quoted from a different portion of the
deposition in question (R. 415). Harrison's reliance on other
parts of his deposition constitutes a waiver of any objection he
could have asserted below.
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transcript (R. 832) ,8 that transcript reflects the fact that the
trial court read the relevant deposition testimony aloud to
Harrison's counsel (R. 832 at page 29, line 6-13), and then
offered Harrison's counsel the opportunity to respond (R. 832 on
page 29, line 14 to page 36, line 8).

Harrison's counsel's

failure to object or present other portions of Harrison's
deposition precludes consideration of that issue on appeal.
Finally, Harrison failed to present the due process issue in
his Amended Docketing Statement or in his original Docketing
Statement as required by Rule 9(c)(5) of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure.
Because Harrison failed to preserve his due process issue
for appeal, this Court should deny any relief on his claims for
violation of the same.
B.
Even if Harrison had Preserved the Due Process
Argument for Appeal, There was No Violation of Harrison's Due
Process Rights.
Harrison has cited no legal authority in support of his
assertions that Dreitzler and Werner's were required to file the
entire deposition transcript with the trial court and that the
failure to do so violated his due process rights.

In fact, the

relevant legal authorities are to the contrary.
8. "Neither the court nor the appellee is obligated to
correct appellant's deficiencies in providing the relevant
portions of the transcript." Utah R. App. P. 11(e)(2).
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Specifically, Rule 4-502(4) of the Code of Judicial
Administration provided that:
Depositions taken pursuant to the Rules of
Civil Procedure shall not be filed with the
clerk of the court except as provided in this
Code or upon order of the court for good
cause shown• (emphasis supplied).9
Further, the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provide that:
If only part of a deposition is offered in
evidence by a party/ an adverse party may
require him to introduce any other part which
ought in fairness to be considered with the
part introduced, and any party may introduce
any other parts.
Utah R. Civ. P. 32(a)(4). (emphasis supplied).
As shown above, the applicable rules contemplate that only a
portion of deposition testimony may be presented to the trial
court and an adverse party may then respond by providing
additional transcripts pages as may be necessary for that party
to defend his/her position.

As has been detailed hereinabove,

Harrison had the opportunity to put additional portions of the
deposition before the trial court and failed to do so.10
9. Although Rule 4-502 was repealed effective November 1,
1999, it was in effect at all times relevant herein.
10. Harrison's position seems to be, much like his brief on
appeal, that the trial court had an obligation to scour the
record for information and analysis that supported Harrison's
bare, unsupported assertions: "Had Judge Medley read the entire
deposition, which of course, Appellant believed he had, and was
also his right to expect that he had . . . ." Harrison cites no
source for this "right." Given Harrison's failure to present
24

Because Harrison cannot demonstrate that Dreitzler and
Werner's failed to comply with any legal requirement, or that
Harrison had any due process right that was violated, this issue
is not well taken and the orders of the trial court should be
affirmed.
IV.
HARRISON'S BRIEF IS INADEQUATE
UNDER RULE 24 AND HARRISON HAS
FAILED TO PROVIDE THIS COURT WITH
ANY MEANS TO REVIEW THE TRIAL
COURT'S ORDERS
A,
Harrison's Brief Fails to Satisfy the Minimal
Requirements of Rule 24.
Rule 2 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires
that briefs "contain reasoned analysis based upon relevant legal
authority."

Smith v. Smith 1999 UT App. 370, 18, 384 Utah Adv.

30 (citing Utah R. App. P. 24(j) and State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d
299, 304-05 (Utah 1998)).

When an appellant fails to present an

adequate brief, the trial court's decisions will be affirmed.
See Smith v. Smith, 1999 UT App. 370, 18, 784 Utah Adv. Rep. 30.
Utah's appellate courts have refused to consider issues on appeal
where parties' arguments have failed to cite any legal authority
(See Id. at 110) or have failed to apply general legal authority
additional deposition testimony to the trial court - or even to
argue that it might be relevant - it appears that Harrison
expected the trial court to develop his arguments below in much
the same way his brief places that burden on this Court.
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to the facts of a case (See Id, at 111 and Thomas, 961 P.2d at
305) •
Under the standards developed by Utah's Appellate Courts
applying Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure,
Harrison's brief is wholly inadequate.

In support of Harrison's

due process argument, Harrison provides no legal authority or
analysis but only states that:
The Law, regarding due process and every
citizen's right thereto, is so self-evident
that no citations of authority are deemed
necessary in its application to this case.
(Appellant's Brief at 26).

In so doing, Harrison has

impermissibly shifted "the burden of argument and research" onto
the Court.

See Thomas, 961 P.2d at 305 (quoting State v. Bishop,

753 P.2d 439, 450 (Utah 1998) (with Bishop quoting Williamson v.
Opsehl, 416 N.E. 2d 783, 784 (1981)).
In the same vein, Appellant's Brief devotes a great deal of
discussion to issues surrounding the transcript of Plaintiff's
deposition.

In that discussion, however, Harrison cites to no

legal authority whatsoever and fails to provide the Court with
any legal basis to review the trial court's decision.
With regard to the legal standards applicable to motions for
summary judgment, Appellant's brief includes nearly five (5)
pages of quotations from Utah cases.
22-26.

See Appellant's Brief at

Harrison has not, however, provided the Court with any
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analysis of those cases or with any application of that law to
the matters at issue in this appeal.

"Extensive quotations from

numerous case authorities and treatises, while helpful, cannot
substitute for the development of appellate arguments explicitly
tied to the record before us," West Valley City v. Majestic
Investment Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1313 n.l (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
Again, Harrison has impermissibly placed the burden of analysis
on the Court.
B.
Harrison's Counsel Should be Required to Pay
Appellee's Attorney's Fees on Appeal,
Rule 24(j) permits the Court to require Harrison's Counsel
to pay Appellee's attorney's fees:
Briefs which are not in compliance may be
disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua
sponte by the court, and the court may assess
attorney fees against the offending lawyer.
Utah R. App. P.2d 24(j)(emphasis supplied).

The Court should

exercise its discretion to do so in this case, particularly in
light of the extra efforts necessitated by the inadequacies of
Harrison's brief.11

11. Further, Dreitzler and Werner's assert that Harrison's
arguments regarding due process and the deposition transcript,
presented without any reference to supporting legal authority,
are frivolous for the purpose of awarding just damages, including
attorney's fees, under Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure. Under Rule 33(a), attorney's fees may be awarded
against the party or his attorney.
27

VIII.
CONCLUSION
The orders of the trial court should be affirmed.

Harrison

has not presented any issue for appeal as to the oral
indemnification claim against Dreitzler and the trial court
correctly determined the 1987 Mercedes was never traded by
Harrison to Werner's.
Further, Harrison's due process claim was not preserved for
appeal.

Even if it were, Harrison cannot prevail on the merits

of that claim.

Not only has Harrison failed to provide any legal

authority in support of his due process argument, but the legal
authorities presented by Dreitzler and Werner's are to the
contrary.
Finally, Harrison's brief is woefully inadequate under Rule
24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Under Rules 24(j)

and 33(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the trial
court's decisions should be affirmed and Dreitzler and Werner's
should be awarded their attorney's fees on appeal.
DATED this

<P3~~ day of

/^^-y

, 2000.

Respectfully submitted,

Phillip W" Dyer
Kevin C. Timken
Attorneys for Appellees
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UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

He amendtficnts directed that the new process be applicable only to cases filed on or
^November 1, 1999.'

Ri

Rule 32

A m e n d m e n t N o t e s . — The 1999 amendment rewrote this ru\c.

\1. Depositions upon written questions.

(a) 9 k m g questions; notice.
(1) A ^ ^ : t y may take the testimony of any person, including a party, byj
depositio^Mpn written questions without leave of court except as provided j |
p a r a g r a p h ^ ^ T h e attendance of witnesses may be compelled by the usj
subpoena a s ^ B ^ i d e d in Rule 45.
(2) A party I M M obtain leave of court, which shall be granted to thaflBffent
consistent w i t l r f l ^ p r i n c i p l e s stated in Rule 26(b)(2), if the p e n d H ^ o be
examined is connffl^in prison or if, without the written s t i p u l j f f l ^ of the
parties,
(A) a proposed depHJfcon would result in more than ten dgfflKtions being
taken under this rule a^R^le 30 by the plaintiffs, or by t h ^ j p e n d a n t s , or by
third-party defendants;
(B) the person to be exaSJShed has already been depoflBTin the case; or
(C) a party seeks to take a»8bosition before the tin^gBecified in Rule 26(d).
(3) A party desiring to t a k e ^ ^ p o s i t i o n upon wrigBrTquestions shall serve
them upon every other party w i t r a i notice stating^jwxhe name and address of
the person who is to answer t h e n ^ T k n o w n , a r r a a r t h e name is not known, a
general description sufficient to idesraj^ him Qffl®? particular class or group to
which he belongs, and (2) the n a m G § « dejiaffptive title and address of the
aken. A deposition upon written
officer before whom the deposition is
£e corporation or a partnership or
questions may be taken of a public or
mce with the provisions of Rule
association or governmental agency ijj
30(b)(6).
(4) Within 14 days after the notjjBShd wri^ffltouestions are served, a party
may serve cross questions upoiaaHr other p a r o H ^ W i t h i n 7 days after being
served with cross q u e s t i o n s , ^ W a r t y may serve^Mlirect questions upon all
other parties. Within 7 d a v s j g H r being served witliWwlirect questions, a party
may serve recross questiagHTpon all other p a r t i e s . ^ j ^ c o u r t may for cause
shown enlarge or shortejflBfe time.
(b) Officer to take rfigfhses and prepare record. A clffl^pf the notice and
copies of all auestio^Pserved shall be delivered by t n H g a r t y taking the
deposition to the oJ&Fr designated in the notice, who shalnBByeed promptly,
in the manner pjmKed by Rule 30(c), (e), and (f), attaching flBBfae deposition
the copy of ihe^Kice
and the questions received.
(Amended e i j ^ ^ e November 1, 1999.)
A d v i s o r v ^ H h m i t t e e N o t e . — For a complete exp^^^Ron of the 1999 amendments to
this ru]^^ma the interrelationship of these
xs with the other discovery changes,
laVisory committee note appended to
The Supreme Court order approving
nendments directed that the new procebe applicable onlv_

ment rewrote the first paragraph^^BKubdivision (a/ as Subdivisions (a)< 1) and <2n^^ypnating the following paragraphs as (a)(3^^^L(4);
in Subdivision (a)(4), substituted "14 daJ^Bfcr
"30 days" in the first sentence and "7 d a ^
"10 days' 1 in the second and third senterij
deleted from Subdivision (b) specific provisiol
Subdivision (cl

Rule 32. Use of depositions in court proceedings.
(a) Use of depositions. At the trial or upon the hearing of a motion or an
interlocutory proceeding, any part or all of a deposition, so far as admissible
under the rules of evidence applied as though the witness were then present
and testifying, may be used against any party who was present or represented

Rule 32
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at the taking of the deposition or who had reasonable notice thereof, in
accordance with any of the following provisions:
(1) Any deposition may be used by any party for the purpose of contradicting
or impeaching the testimony of [a] deponent as a witness or for any other
purpose permitted by the Utah Rules of Evidence.
(2) The deposition of a party or of anyone who at the time of taking the
deposition was an officer, director, or managing agent, or a person designated
under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a) to testify on behalf of a public or private
corporation, partnership or association or governmental agency which is a
party may be used by an adverse party for any purpose.
(3) The deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, may be used by any
party for any purpose if the court finds:
(A) t h a t the witness is dead; or
(B) t h a t the witness is at a greater distance t h a n 100 miles from the place
of trial or hearing, or is out of the United States, unless it appears t h a t the
absence of the witness was procured by the party offering the deposition; or
(C) t h a t the witness is unable to attend or testify because of age, illness,
infirmity, or imprisonment; or
(D) that the party offering the deposition has been unable to procure the
attendance of the witness by subpoena; or
(E) upon application and notice, t h a t such exceptional circumstances exist
as to make it desirable, in the interest of justice and with due regard to the
importance of presenting the testimony of witnesses orally in open court, to
allow the deposition to be used.
(4) If only part of a deposition is offered in evidence by a party, an adverse
party may require him to introduce any other part which ought in fairness to
be considered with the part introduced, and any party may introduce any other
parts.
Substitution of parties p u r s u a n t to Rule 25 does not affect the right to use
depositions previously taken; and when an action has been brought in any
court of the United States or of any state and another action involving the
same subject matter is afterward brought between the same parties or their
representatives or successors in interest, all depositions lawfully taken and
duly filed in the former action may be used in the latter as if originally taken
therefor. A deposition previously taken may also be used as permitted by the
Utah Rules of Evidence.
(b) Objections to admissibility. Subject to the provisions of Rule 28(b) and
Subdivision (c)(3) of this rule, objection may be made at the trial or hearing to
receiving in evidence any deposition or p a r t thereof for any reason which would
require the exclusion of the evidence if the witness were then present and
testifying.
(c) Effect of errors and
irregularities.
(1) As to notice. All errors and irregularities in the notice for taking a
deposition are waived unless written objection is promptly served upon the
party giving the notice.
(2) As to disqualification of officer. Objection to taking a deposition because
of disqualification of the officer before whom it is to be taken is waived unless
made before the taking of the deposition begins or as soon thereafter as the
disqualification becomes known or could be discovered with reasonable diligence.
(3) As to taking of deposition.
(A) Objections to the competency of a witness or to the competency,
relevancy, or materiality of testimony are not waived by failure to make them
before or during the taking of the deposition, unless the ground of the objection
is one which might have been obviated or removed if presented at that/time.
(B) Errors and irregularities occurring at the oral examination in the
manner of taking the deposition, in the form of the questions or answers, in the
oath or affirmation, or in the conduct of parties, and errors of any kind which
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might be obviated, removed, or cured if promptly presented are waived unless
seasonable objection thereto is made at the taking of the deposition.
(C) Objections to the form of written questions submitted under Rule 31 are
waived unless served in writing upon the party propounding them within the
time allowed for serving the succeeding cross or other questions and within 5
days after service of the last questions authorized.
(4) As to completion and return of deposition. Errors and irregularities in
the manner in which the testimony is transcribed or the deposition is prepared,
signed, certified, sealed, endorsed, transmitted, filed, or otherwise dealt with
by the officer under Rules 30 and 31 are waived unless a motion to suppress the
deposition or some part thereof is made with reasonable promptness after such
defect is, or with due diligence might have been, ascertained.
(d) Publication of deposition. Use of a deposition under Subsection (a) of this
rule shall have the effect of publishing the deposition unless the court orders
otherwise in response to objections.
(Amended effective J a n . 1, 1987; April 29, 1999.)
Advisory Committee Note. — For a complete explanation of the 1999 amendments to
this rule and the interrelationship of these
amendments with the other discovery
see the a d v ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^
^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ a e r approving

the amendments directed that the new procedures be applicable only to cases filed on or
after November 1, 1999.
iotes. — The April 1999
LJC)(3)W for ^

"Subdivision (dJC

Interrogatories to parties.
(a) AuaTSM^v; procedures for use. Without leave of court^Sj&written
stipulation, a ^ W f c t y m a v serve upon any other party written iggra^ogatories,
not exceeding 2 5 H ^ f e m b e r including all discrete subparts, tg^SHinswered by
the party served or^nHfeaparty served is a public or p r i ^ ^ ^ c o r p o r a t i o n , a
partnership, an associatr^gfcr^a governmental agency, b|%sny officer or agent,
who shall furnish such infonmjfcon as is available toJip^party. Leave to serve
additional interrogatories shan^H^granted to th^Kj^Bnt consistent with the
principles of Rule 26(b)(2). WitMHWeave of^jmrt or written stipulation,
interrogatories may not be served b(%8^he4iJgEspecified in Rule 26(d).
(b) Answers and objections.
(1) Each interrogatory shall be a n s w |
^parately and fully in writing
under oath, unless it is objected to, m$Sfiier
it the objecting party shall
state the reasons for objection and §&©|ransweri
extent the interrogatory
is not objectionable.
ing them, and the
(2) The answers are to be jjjjSfted by the persor
objections signed by the a t t ^ ^ y making them.
(3) The party upon whrnd^fe interrogatories have been^Sfcjed shall serve a
copy of the answers anjfe!ewjJections, if any, within 30 days a*Sa£he service of
the interrogatories. A^aSrrter or longer time may be ordered b ^ ^ f ^ g o u r t or, in
the absence of sucljggporder, agreed to in writing by the parties sufflkt to Rule
29.
(4) All groujfiSrfor an objection to an interrogatory shall be stalSSfcwith
specificity. ^ W g r o u n d not stated in a timely objection is waived u n l e s S ^ e
party's faJffle to object is excused by the court for good cause shown.
(5) T^Hparty submitting the interrogatories may move for an order unc
Rulj^Mra) with respect to any objection to or other failure to answer an^
inJ^Hogatory.
Scope; use at trial. Interrogatories may relate to any matters which can
be inquired into under Rule 26(b), and the answers may be used to the extent
permitted by the Rules of Evidence.
An interrogatory otherwise proper is not necessarily objectionable merely
because an answer to the interrogatory involves an opinion or contention t h a t
relates to fact or the application of law to fact, but the court may order t h a t
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Rule 52. Findings by the court.
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an
advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its
conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule
58A; in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly
set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute the
grounds of its action. Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes of
review. Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall
not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. The
findings of a master, to the extent that the court adopts them, shall be
considered as the findings of the court. It will be sufficient if the findings of fact
and conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded in open court following
the close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of decision
filed by the court. The trial court need not enter findings of fact and conclusions
of law in rulings on motions, except as provided in Rule 4Kb). The court shall,
however, issue a brief written statement of the ground for its decision on all
motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 when the motion
is based on more than one ground.
(b) Amendment. Upon motion of a party made not later than 10 days after
entry of judgment the court may amend its findings or make additional
findings and may amend the judgment accordingly. The motion may be made
with a motion for a new trial p u r s u a n t to Rule 59. When findings of fact are
made in actions tried by the court without a jury, the question of the sufficiency
of the evidence to support the findings may thereafter be raised whether or not
the party raising the question has made in the district court an objection to
such findings or has made either a motion to amend them, a motion for
judgment, or a motion for a new trial.
(c) Waiver of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Except in actions for
divorce, findings of fact and conclusions of law may be waived by the parties to
an issue of fact:
(1) by default or by failing to appear at the trial;
(2) by consent in writing, filed in the cause;
(3) by oral consent in open court, entered in the minutes.
(Amended effective J a n . 1, 1987.)
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
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Rule 56

Rule 56. Summary judgment.
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part
thereof.
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time,
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his
favor as to all or any part thereof.
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits
shall be filed and served in accordance with CJA 4-501. The judgment sought
shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a
genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy
and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall
thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial
controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or other
relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action
as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed
established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly.
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and
opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such
facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the
affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified
copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached

Rule 56
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thereto or served therewith. The court; may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further
affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as
provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations
or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise
provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if
appropriate, shall be entered against him.
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a
party opposing the motion t h a t he cannot for reasons stated present by
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such
other order as is just.
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of the
court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are
presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the amount
of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused him to
incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or attorney
may be adjudged guilty of contempt.
(Amended effective November 1, 1997.)

x e n c e i o r the former first sentence which
^ T h e motion shall be served at least 10
d a j ^ ^ ^ b r e the time fixed for the hearing";
d e l e f t ^ ^ ^ f o r m e r second sentence which read
"The a c ^ ^ ^ p a r t y prior to the day of hearing

second sentence.
C o m p i l e r ' s N o t e s . — This rule ig
Rule 56, F.R.C.P.
C r o s s R e f e r e n c e s . — C o g j g ^ K generally,
§§ 78-7-18, 78-32-1 et se
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OPERATION OF THE COURTS

Rule 4-502

Rule 4-502. Discovery procedures in civil cases.
Intent:
To establish a procedure for the filing of discovery documents.
To establish a limitation on discovery procedures within 30 days of trial.
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to the District and Juvenile Courts.
Statement of the Rule:
(1) Parties conducting discovery under Rules 33, 34 and 36 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure shall not file discovery requests with the clerk of the
court, but shall file only the original certificate of service stating that the
discovery requests have been served on the other parties and the date of
service. The responding party shall file a similar certificate with the clerk of
the court.
(2) The party serving the discovery request shall retain the original with a
copy of the proof of service affixed to it and serve a copy of the discovery request
and proof of service upon the opposing party or counsel. The party responding
to the discovery request shall retain the original with a copy of the proof of
service affixed to it, and serve a copy of the responses and the proof of service
upon the opposing party or counsel. The discovery requests and response shall
not be filed with the clerk of the court unless the court on motion and notice
and for good cause shown so orders.
(3) Any party filing a motion to compel compliance with a discovery request
or a motion which relies upon the discovery response shall attach a copy of the
discovery request or response which is at issue in the motion.
(4) Depositions taken pursuant to the Rules of Civil Procedure shall not be
filed with the clerk of the court except as provided in this Code or upon order
of the court for good cause shown.
(5) All parties shall be entitled to conduct discovery proceedings in accordance with this rule. All discovery proceedings shall be completed, including all
responses thereto, and all depositions and other documents filed with the court
no later than thirty (30) days before the date set for trial of the case. The right
to conduct discovery proceedings within thirty (30) days before trial shall be
within the discretion of the court. Motions to conduct discovery within thirty
(30) days before trial shall be presented to the judge assigned to the case upon
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notice to the other parties in the action. In exercising its discretion, the court
shall take into consideration the necessity and reasons for such discovery, the
diligence or lack of diligence of the parties seeking such discovery, whether
permitting such discovery will prevent the case from going to trial on the
scheduled date, or result in prejudice to any party. Nothing herein shall
preclude or limit the voluntary exchange of information or discovery by
stipulation of the parties at any time prior to the date set for trial, but in no
event shall such exchanges or stipulations require a court to grant a continuance of the trial date.
(Amended effective January 15, 1990; April 15, 1991; November 1, 1996.)
Amendment Notes. — The 1996 amendment deleted provisions relating to circuit
courts from the applicability paragraph.

• establish a uniform procedure for submitting and^fuesting jury instruc-

Ipability:
rule shall apply to the District and Justic
S t a t l ^ n n t of the Rule:
(1) ^^Lury instruction requests shall be
mted to the court five days
prior to^^k scheduled trial date unless othe JPse ordered by the court. The
court, in indiscretion, may allow the presej fion of jury instructions at any
time priorl^fce submission of the case to j ^jury. At the time of presentation
to the court,^^^py of the requested instrj 3ns shall be furnished to opposing
counsel.
(2) Jury i n s l ^ ^ i o n requests mu^W6 in writing and state in full the
instruction requl^kd. Each requestiBlll be upon a separate sheet of paper,
the original and co]^Lof which shaMH?free from red lines and firm names and
shall be entitled:
iction No.
The number of the reqi
all be written in lead pencil,
(3) If case citations are
in support of a requested instruction, at least
one copy of the requeste<
ion furnished to the court shall be submitted
without the citations.
t i o ^ ^ p a y be provided upon separate sheets attached to the particulj
s t r u c l ^ ^ t o which the citation applies.
(Amended effective
lary 15, I ^ H ; November 1, 1996.)
Amendment Note
The 1996 amenfl
ment deleted provj^
relating to circuit
courts from the a p |
bility paragraph.

Rule 4-5(

Written orders, j u d s ^ e n t s and decrees.

Intent:
To est^B&h a uniform procedure for subrnil
written orders, judgments,
and de^Hcs to the court. This rule is not intenc to change existing law with
respe^Ho the enforceability of unwritten agreed
ability:
Apt
r
of record except small
rule shall apply to all civil proceedings in col
cla
j e m e n t of the Rule:
|) In all rulings by a court, counsel for the party of^f&rties obtaining the
ruling shall within fifteen days, or within a shorter time as the court may
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petition" near the end of Subdivision (b).

Rule 9. Docketing statement.
(a) Time for filing. Within 21 days after a notice of appeal, cross-appeal, or
a petition for review is filed, the appellant, cross-appellant, or petitioner shall
file a docketing statement with the clerk of the appellate court. An original and
two copies of the docketing statement shall be filed with the court.
(b) Purpose of docketing statement. The docketing statement is not a brief
and should not contain arguments or procedural motions. It is used by the
appellate court in assigning cases to the Supreme Court or to the Court of
Appeals when both have jurisdiction, in making certifications to the Supreme
Court, in classifying cases for determining the priority to be accorded them, in
making summary dispositions when appropriate, and in making calendar
assignments. When a petition for interlocutory review is granted under Rule 5,
a docketing statement shall not be filed, unless otherwise ordered.
(c) Content of docketing statement. The docketing statement shall contain
the following information in the order set forth below:
(1) The date of the judgment or order sought to be reviewed; the date of all
motions filed pursuant to Rules 50(a) and (b), 52(b), 54(b), or 59, Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, or Rules 24 or 26, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, or a
statement that no such motions have been filed; the date and effect of all orders
disposing of such motions; and the date the notice of appeal or the petition for
review was filed.
(2)(A) The specific rule or statutory authority that confers jurisdiction on
the appellate court to decide the appeal or the petition for review.
(B) If an appeal is from an order in a multiple-party or a multiple-claim
case, and the judgment has been certified as a final judgment by the trial court
pursuant to Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
(i) a statement of what claims and parties remain before the trial court for
adjudication and
(ii) a statement of whether the facts underlying the appeal are sufficiently
similar to the facts underlying the claims remaining before the trial court to
constitute res judicata on those claims.
(C) If the case contains a claim for damages, the amount of the claim,
exclusive of court costs, interests, and attorney fees.
(3) A concise statement of the nature of the proceeding, e.g., "thj& appeal is
from a final judgment or decree of the
court" or "this
petition is to review an order of
administrative agency."
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(4) A concise statement of facts material to a consideration of the questions
presented.
(5) The issues presented by the appeal, expressed in the terms and circumstances of the case, but without unnecessary detail. The questions should not
be repetitious. General conclusions such as "the judgment of the trial court is
not supported by the law or facts," are not acceptable. For each issue appellant
m u s t state the applicable standard of appellate review and cite supporting
authority.
(6) If the appeal is subject to assignment by the Supreme Court to the Court
of Appeals, the phrase "Subject to assignment to the Court of Appeals" should
appear immediately under the title of the document, i.e., "Docketing Statement."
(7) If the appeal is subject to assignment by the Supreme Court to the Court
of Appeals, the appellant may set forth concisely in not more t h a n two pages
why the Supreme Court should decide the case. The Supreme Court may, for
example, consider whether the case presents or involves one or more of the
following:
(A) a substantial constitutional issue not yet decided and, if so, what the
issue or issues are;
(B) an issue of first impression in the state and of substantial importance in
the administration of justice;
(C) a conflict in Court of Appeals decisions t h a t needs to be resolved by the
Supreme Court;
(D) any other persuasive reason why the Supreme Court should resolve the
issue.
(8) Citations to statutes, rules, or cases believed to be determinative of the
respective issues stated.
(9) A reference to all related or prior appeals in the case. If the reference is
to a prior appeal, the appropriate citation should be given.
(d) Necessary attachments. Attached to each copy of the docketing statement
shall be a copy of the following:
(1) The final judgment and any other order sought to be reviewed;
(2) Any opinion or findings;
(3) All motions filed pursuant to Rules 50(a) and (b), 52(b), 54(b), and 59,
U t a h Rules of Civil Procedure, and orders disposing of such motions; and
(4) The notice of appeal and any order extending the time for the filing of a
notice of appeal.
(e) Attachment to indicate date filed. The attachments required by this rule
m u s t bear a clear representation of the original date of filing by means of the
trial court's filing seal or m a r k or a copy conformed to t h e original by the trial
court.
(f) Response to statement regarding assignment. If the appeal is subject to
assignment by the Supreme Court to the Court of Appeals, the appellee may
file a response to the appellant's contentions in s u b p a r a g r a p h (c)(7). If
appellant filed no statement under (c)(7), the appellee m a y file a statement in
the same form as provided by (c)(7). The response may support or oppose the
appellant's position. The response or statement shall not be more t h a n two
pages long, and shall be filed within 10 days after service of the docketing
statement.
(g) Consequences of failure to comply. Docketing s t a t e m e n t s which fail to
comply with this rule will not be accepted. Failure to comply may result in
dismissal of the appeal or the petition.
(Amended effective October 1, 1992; July 1, 1994; April 1, 1996; April 1, 1998;
November 1, 1999.)
Amendment Notes. — The 1999 amendment substituted "two copies" for "three copies"
in the second sentence of Subdivision (a).
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Rule 11. The record on appeal.
(a) Composition of the record on appeal. The original papers and exhibits
filed in the trial court, the transcript of proceedings, if any, the index prepared
by the clerk of the trial court, and the docket sheet, shall constitute the record
on appeal in all cases. A copy of the record certified by the clerk of the trial
court to conform to the original may be substituted for the original as the
record on appeal. Only those papers prescribed under paragraph (d) of this rule
shall be transmitted to the appellate court.
(b) Pagination and indexing of record.
(1) Immediately upon filing of the notice of appeal, the clerk of the trial court
shall securely fasten the record in a trial court case file, with collation in the
following order:
(A) the index prepared by the clerk;
(B) the docket sheet;
(C) all original papers in chronological order;
(D) all published depositions in chronological order; and
(E) all transcripts prepared for appeal in chronological order.
(2)(A) The clerk shall mark the bottom right corner of every page of the
collated index, docket sheet, and all original papers as well as the cover page
only of all published depositions and the cover page only of each volume of
transcripts constituting the record with a sequential number using one series
of numerals for the entire record.
(B) If a supplemental record is forwarded to the appellate court, the clerk
shall collate the papers, depositions, and transcripts of the supplemental
record in the same order as the original record and m a r k the bottom right
corner of each page of the collated original papers as well as the cover page only
of all published depositions and the cover page only of each volume of
transcripts constituting the supplemental record with a sequential number
beginning with the number next following the number of the last page of the
original record.
(3) The clerk shall prepare a chronological index of the record. The index
shall contain a reference to the date on which the paper, deposition or
transcript was filed in the trial court and the starting page of the record on
which the paper, deposition or transcript will be found.
(4) Clerks of the trial and appellate courts shall establish rules and
procedures for checking out the record after pagination for use by the parties
in preparing briefs for an appeal or in preparing or briefing a petition for writ
of certiorari.
(c) Duty of appellant. After filing the notice of appeal, the appellant, or in the
event that more t h a n one appeal is taken, each appellant, shall comply with
the provisions of paragraphs (d) and (e) of this rule and shall take any other
action necessary to enable the clerk of the trial court to assemble and transmit
the record. A single record shall be transmitted.
(d) Papers on appeal.
(1) Criminal cases. All of the papers in a criminal case shall be included by
the clerk of the trial court as part of the record on appeal.
(2) Civil cases. In all civil cases, the papers to be transmitted shall consist of
the following.
(A) Civil cases with short records. In civil cases where all the papers,
excluding any transcripts, total fewer than 300 pages, all of the papers will be
transmitted to the appellate court upon completion of the filing of briefs. In
such cases, the appellant shall serve upon the clerk of the trial court,
simultaneously with the filing of appellants reply brief, notice of the date on
which appellant's reply brief was filed. If appellant does not intend to file a
reply brief, appellant shall notify the clerk of the trial court of t h a t feet within
30 days of the filing of appellee's brief.
(B) All other civil cases. In all other civil cases where the papers, excluding
any transcripts, are or exceed 300 pages, all parties shall file with the clerk of

51

UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE

R u l e 11

the trial court, within 10 days after briefing is completed, a joint or separate
designation of those papers referred to in their respective briefs. Only those
designated papers and the following, to the extent applicable, shall be
transmitted to the clerk of the appellate court by the clerk of the trial court:
(i) the pleadings as defined in Rule 7(a), U t a h Rules of Civil Procedure;
(ii) the pretrial order, if any;
(iii) the final judgment, order, or interlocutory order from which the appeal
is taken;
(iv) other orders sought to be reviewed, if any;
(v) any supporting opinion, findings of fact or conclusions of law filed or
delivered by the trial court;
(vi) the motion, response, and accompanying memoranda upon which the
court rendered judgment, if any;
(vii) jury instructions given, if any;
(viii) jury verdicts and interrogatories, if any;
(ix) the notice of appeal.
(3) Agency cases. Where all papers in the agency record total fewer t h a n 300
pages, the agency shall transmit all papers to the appellate court. Where all
papers in the agency record total 300 or more pages, the parties shall, within
10 days after briefing is completed, file with the agency a joint or separate
designation of those papers necessary to the appeal. The agency shall t r a n s m i t
those designated papers to the appellate court. Instead of filing all papers or
designated papers, the agency may, with the approval of the court, file only the
chronological index of the record or of such p>arts of the record as the parties
may designate. All parts of the record retained by the agency shall be
considered p a r t of the record on review for all purposes.
(e) The transcript of proceedings; duty of appellant to order; notice to
appellee if partial transcript is ordered.
(1) Request for transcript; time for filing. Within 10 days after filing the
notice of appeal, the appellant shall request from the court executive a
transcript of such parts of the proceedings not already on file as the appellant
deems necessary. The request shall be in writing and shall state t h a t the
transcript is needed for purposes of an appeal. Within the same period, a copy
shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court and the clerk of the appellate
court. If the appellant desires a transcript in a compressed format, appellant
shall include t h e request for a compressed format within the request for
transcript. If no such parts of the proceedings are to be requested, within the
same period the appellant shall file a certificate to t h a t effect with the clerk of
the trial court and a copy with the clerk of the appellate court.
(2) Transcript required of all evidence regarding challenged finding or
conclusion. If the appellant intends to urge on appeal t h a t a finding or
conclusion is unsupported by or is contrary to the evidence, the appellant shall
include in the record a transcript of all evidence relevant to such finding or
conclusion. Neither the court nor the appellee is obligated to correct appellant's
deficiencies in providing the relevant portions of the transcript.
(3) Statement of issues; cross-designation
by appellee. Unless the entire
transcript is to be included, the appellant shall, within 10 days after filing the
notice of appeal, file a statement of the issues t h a t will be presented on appeal
and shall serve on the appellee a copy of the request or certificate and a copy
of the statement. If the appellee deems a transcript of other parts of the
proceedings to be necessary, the appellee shall, within 10 days after the service
of the request or certificate and the statement of the appellant, file and serve
on the appellant a designation of additional parts to be included. Unless within
10 days after service of such designation the appellant has requested such
parts and has so notified the appellee, the appellee may within the following 10
days either request the parts or move in the trial court for an order requiring
the appellant to do so.

Rule 14

52

UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE

(f) Agreed statement as the record on appeal. In lieu of the record on appeal
as defined in paragraph (a) of this rule, the parties may prepare and sign a
statement of the case, showing how the issues presented by the appeal arose
and were decided in the trial court and setting forth only so many of the facts
averred and proved or sought to be proved as are essential to a decision of the
issues presented. If the statement conforms to the truth, it, together with such
additions as the trial court may consider necessary fully to present the issues
raised by the appeal, shall be approved by the trial court. The clerk of the trial
court shall transmit the statement to the clerk of the appellate court within the
time prescribed by Rule 12(b)(2). The clerk of the trial court shall transmit the
index of the record to the clerk of the appellate court upon approval of the
statement by the trial court.
(g) Statement of evidence or proceedings when no report was made or when
transcript is unavailable. If no report of the evidence or proceedings at a
hearing or trial was made, or if a transcript is unavailable, or if the appellant
is impecunious and unable to afford a transcript in a civil case, the appellant
may prepare a statement of the evidence or proceedings from the best available
means, including recollection. The statement shall be served on the appellee,
who may serve objections or propose amendments within 10 days after service.
The statement and any objections or proposed amendments shall be submitted
to the trial court for settlement and approval and, as settled and approved,
shall be included by the clerk of the trial court in the record on appeal.
(h) Correction or modification of the record. If any difference arises as to
whether the record truly discloses what occurred in the trial court, the
difference shall be submitted to and settled by that court and the record made
to conform to the truth. If anything material to either party is omitted from the
record by error or accident or is misstated, the parties by stipulation, the trial
court, or the appellate court, either before or after the record is transmitted,
may direct that the omission or misstatement be corrected and if necessary
that a supplemental record be certified and transmitted. The moving party, or
the court if it is acting on its own initiative, shall serve on the parties a
statement of the proposed changes. Within 10 days after service, any party
may serve objections to the proposed changes. All other questions as to the
form and content of the record shall be presented to the appellate court.
(Amended effective October 1, 1992; July 1, 1994; April 1, 1995; January 1,
1998; April 1, 1998; November 1, 1999.)
Amendment Notes. — The 1999 amendment in Subdivision (e)(1) added the language

beginning "and shall state" to the end of the
second sentence and made a related change.

ORDERS OF ADMINISTRATIVE
AGENCIES, COMMISSIONS,
COMMITTEES
Rule 14. Review of^a^^^^^atj^j^waers:
intervention.

how obtained;

(a) Petition for review ofodBjPfiint p e ^ t a S ^ H t a J u d i c i a l review by the
Supreme Court or thejGgH^TAppeals is providecrflKfejiite of an order or
decision of an admLjja|^ive agency, board, commission^^Wfefctee. or officer
(hereinafter t h ^ H H i "agency" shall include agency, boaSHfegmission,
committee^BPrcer), a petition for review shall be filed with t h e c S H h ^ h e
a p p e l l ^ j p f f t within the time prescribed by statute, or if there is n?
prg^jBmTthen within 30 days after the date of the written decision or ord
letition shall specify the parties seeking review and shall designate the
!Spondent(s) and the order or decision, or part thereof, to be reviewed. In each
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the clerk. Filing shall not be timely unless the papers are received by the clerly
Atihin the time fixed for filing, except that briefs shall be deemed filed o n t l f l
c R ^ ^ f the postmark if first class mail is utilized. If a motion requestsjdjK
whiSMnay be granted by a single justice or judge, the justice or jud^BP^ay
accep^J^motion, note the date of filing, and transmit it to the C l g B r
(b) Se^fcfco/* all papers required. Copies of all papers fi^Bwith the
appellate ^ M t shall, at or before the time of filing, be ser^JBRi all other
parties to the^Bteal or review. Service on a party representgap? counsel shall
be made on couinLpf record, or, if the party is not rea|j^Bnted by counsel,
upon the party at^WBklast known address. A copy (^BBTpaper required by
these rules to be s^Md on a party shall byflHF with the court and
accompanied by proof of^Htorice.
jt^r
(c) Manner of service, ^ j s k e may be p e r ^ H r o r by mail. Personal service
includes delivery of the copy^wgclerk orjljflrresponsible person at the office
of counsel. Service by mail is c ^ S ^ t e | [ ^ R a i l i n g .
(d) Proof of service. Papers^SMpited for filing shall contain an
acknowledgement of service by ^ B ^ S S £ served or a certificate of service in
the form of a statement of thaflH£ anera&nner of service, the names of the
persons served, and the a d ^ B ^ s at whicB^m^were served. The certificate of
service may appear on ^ j ^ ^ m x e d to the p^MsJiled. If counsel of record is
served, the certifica^Br service shall designra^the name of the party
represented by t h ^ H K i s e l .
^K&k.
(e) S i g T i a t a r ^ ^ r p a p e r s filed in the appellate (SSfeyshall be signed by
counsel of rea^^^r by a party who is not representedl/jHtansel.
(Amended^HRive October 1, 1992; November 1, 1 9 9 9 . ) ^ M ^
Am^Hnent Notes. — The 1999 amend-

late court" for "Briefs, petitions^l^Bfc, certif-

Rule 24. Briefs.
(a) Brief of the appellant. The brief of the appellant shall contain under
appropriate headings and in the order indicated:
(1) A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the court or agency
whose judgment or order is sought to be reviewed, except where the caption of
the case on appeal contains the names of all such parties. The list should be set
out on a separate page which appears immediately inside the cover.
(2) A table of contents, including the contents of the addendum, with page
references.
(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and with
parallel citations, rules, statutes and other authorities cited, with references to
the pages of the brief where they are cited.
(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction of the appellate court.
(5) A statement of the issues presented for review, including for each issue:
the standard of appellate review with supporting authority; and
(A) citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial
court; or
(B) a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved in
the trial court.
(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations
whose interpretation is determinative of the appeal or of central importance to
the appeal shall be set out verbatim with the appropriate citation. If the
pertinent part of the provision is lengthy, the citation alone will suffice, and the
provision shall be set forth in an addendum to the brief under paragraph (11)
of this rule.
(7) A statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate briefly the
nature of the case, the course of proceedings, and its disposition in the court
below. A statement of the facts relevant to the issues presented for review shall
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follow. All statements of fact and references to the proceedings below shall be
supported by citations to the record in accordance with paragraph (e) of this
rule.
(8) Summary of arguments. The summary of arguments, suitably
paragraphed, shall be a succinct condensation of the arguments actually made
in the body of the brief. It shall not be a mere repetition of the heading under
which the argument is arranged.
(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of
the appellant with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for
reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the
authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on. A party challenging a
fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged
finding.
(10) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought.
(11) An addendum to the brief or a statement that no addendum is necessary
under this paragraph. The addendum shall be bound as part of the brief unless
doing so makes the brief unreasonably thick. If the addendum is bound
separately, the addendum shall contain a table of contents. The addendum
shall contain a copy of:
(A) any constitutional provision, statute, rule, or regulation of central
importance cited in the brief but not reproduced verbatim in the brief;
(B) in cases being reviewed on certiorari, a copy of the Court of Appeals
opinion; in all cases any court opinion of central importance to the appeal but
not available to the court as part of a regularly published reporter service; and
(C) those parts of the record on appeal that are of central importance to the
determination of the appeal, such as the challenged instructions, findings of
fact and conclusions of law, memorandum decision, the transcript of the court's
oral decision, or the contract or document subject to construction.
(b) Brief of the appellee. The brief of the appellee shall conform to the
requirements of paragraph (a) of this rule, except that the appellee need not
include:
(1) a statement of the issues or of the case unless the appellee is dissatisfied
with the statement of the appellant; or
(2) an addendum, except to provide material not included in the addendum
of the appellant. The appellee may refer to the addendum of the appellant.
(c) Reply brief The appellant may file a brief in reply to the brief of the
appellee, and if the appellee has cross-appealed, the appellee may file a brief in
reply to the response of the appellant to the issues presented by the crossappeal. Reply briefs shall be limited to answering any new matter set forth in
the opposing brief. The content of the reply brief shall conform to the
requirements of paragraph (a)(2), (3), (9), and (10) of this rule. No further
briefs may be filed except with leave of the appellate court.
(d) References in briefs to parties. Counsel will be expected in their briefs
and oral arguments to keep to a minimum references to parties by such
designations as "appellant" and "appellee." It promotes clarity to use the
designations used in the lower court or in the agency proceedings, or the actual
names of parties, or descriptive terms such as "the employee," "the injured
person," "the taxpayer," etc.
(e) References in briefs to the record. References shall be made to the pages
of the original record as paginated pursuant to Rule 1Kb) or to pages of any
statement of the evidence or proceedings or agreed statement prepared
pursuant to Rule 11(f) or 11(g). References to pages of published depositions or
transcripts shall identify the sequential number of the cover page of each
volume as marked by the clerk on the bottom right corner and,.each separately
numbered page(s) referred to within the deposition or transcript as marked by
the transcriber. References to exhibits shall be made to the exhibit numbers. If
reference is made to evidence the admissibility of which is in controversy,
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reference-shall be made to the pages of the record at which the evidence was
identified, offered, and received or rejected.
(f) Length of briefs. Except by permission of the court, principal briefs shall
not exceed 50 pages, and reply briefs shall not exceed 25 pages, exclusive of
pages containing the table of contents, tables of citations and any addendum
containing statutes, rules, regulations, or portions of the record as required by
paragraph (a) of this rule. In cases involving cross-appeals, paragraph (g) of
this rule sets forth the length of briefs.
(g) Briefs in cases involving cross-appeals. If a cross-appeal is filed, the party
first filing a notice of appeal shall be deemed the appellant for the purposes of
this rule and Rule 26, unless the parties otherwise agree or the court otherwise
orders. The brief of the appellant shall not exceed 50 pages in length. The brief
of the appellee/cross-appellant shall contain the issues and arguments involved in the cross-appeal as well as the answer to the brief of the appellant
and shall not exceed 50 pages in length. The appellant shall then file a brief
which contains an answer to the original issues raised by the appellee/crossappellant and a reply to the appellee's response to the issues raised in the
appellant's opening brief. The appellant's second brief shall not exceed 25
pages in length. The appellee/cross-appellant may then file a second brief, not
to exceed 25 pages in length, which contains only a reply to the appellant's
answers to the original issues raised by the appellee/cross-appellant's first
brief. The lengths specified by this rule are exclusive of table of contents, table
of authorities, and addenda and may be exceeded only by permission of the
court. The court shall grant reasonable requests, for good cause shown.
(h) Briefs in cases involving multiple appellants or appellees. In cases
involving more than one appellant or appellee, including cases consolidated for
purposes of the appeal, any number of either may join in a single brief, and any
appellant or appellee may adopt by reference any part of the brief of another.
Parties may similarly join in reply briefs.
(i) Citation of supplemental authorities. When pertinent and significant
authorities come to the attention of a party after that party's brief has been
filed, or after oral argument but before decision, a party may promptly advise
the clerk of the appellate court, by letter setting forth the citations. An original
letter and nine copies shall be filed in the Supreme Court. An original letter
and seven copies shall be filed in the Court of Appeals. There shall be a
reference either to the page of the brief or to a point argued orally to which the
citations pertain, but the letter shall without argument state the reasons for
the supplemental citations. Any response shall be made within 7 days of filing
and shall be similarly limited.
(j) Requirements and sanctions. All briefs under this rule must be concise,
presented with accuracy, logically arranged with proper headings and free
from burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or scandalous matters. Briefs which
are not in compliance may be disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua sponte
by the court, and the court may assess attorney fees against the offending
lawyer.
(k) Brief covers. The covers of all briefs shall be of heavy cover stock and
shall comply with Rule 27.
(Amended effective October 1, 1992; July 1, 1994; April 1, 1995; April 1, 1998;
November 1, 1999.)
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Jtah Law Review. — Recent Developments
ah Law — The Utah Court of Appeals.
l d ^ B f e h L. Rev. 150.

Rule

iterest on judgment.

Unless othe^^^torovided by law, if a ^ ^ H ^ n t for money in a civil case is
affirmed, whatevS^fcwjest is a l l o w ^ ^ B R w shall be payable from the date
the judgment was e n W ^ f c i i L t h ^ ^ ^ ^ o u r t .
,REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 5 C.J.S. Apt|^Mrerror § 995"
A.L.R. — Date fr^^^HRTinterest on judgment starts runj^^Mre affected by modification of amj^^P^judgment on appeal, 4
A.L.R.3J
Rij

Js^ of inadequacy, 15 A.L.R.3d 411.
7
interest on judgment where both
p a r t i e s ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ L . R . 4 t h 1099.
Retrospect^^^fcfcafipn and effect of state
statute or rule ailW^^^^terest or changing
jucuffl^^^^iiardicts, 41

Rule 33. Damages for delay or frivolous appeal; recovery
of attorney's fees.
(a) Damages for delay or frivolous appeal. Except in a first appeal of right in
a criminal case, if the court determines that a motion made or appeal taken
under these rules is either frivolous or for delay, it shall award just damages,
which may include single or double costs, as defined in Rule 34, and/or
reasonable attorney fees, to the prevailing party. The court may order that the
damages be paid by the party or by the party's attorney.
(b) Definitions. For the purposes of these rules, a frivolous appeal, motion,
brief, or other paper is one that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by
existing law, or not based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or
reverse existing law. An appeal, motion, brief, or other paper interposed for the
purpose of delay is one interposed for any improper purpose such as to harass,
cause needless increase in the cost of litigation, or gain time that will benefit
only the party filing the appeal, motion, brief, or other paper.
(c) Procedures.
(1) The court may award damages upon request of any party or upon its own
motion. A party may request damages under this rule only as part of the
appellee's motion for summary disposition under Rule 10, as part of the
appellee's brief, or as part of a party's response to a motion or other paper.
(2) If the award of damages is upon the motion of the court, the court shall
issue to the party or the party's attorney or both an order to show cause why
such damages should not be awarded. The order to show cause shall set forth
the allegations which form the basis of the damages and permit at least ten
days in which to respond unless otherwise ordered for good cause shown. The
order to show cause may be part of the notice of oral argument.
(3) If requested by a party against whom damages may be awarded, the
court shall grant a hearing.
Advisory Committee Note. — Rule 33 is
substantially redrafted to provide definitions
and procedures for assessing penalties for delays and frivolous appeals.
If an appeal is found to be frivolous, the court
must award damages. This is in keeping with
Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
However, the amount of damages — single or

double costs or attorney fees or both — is left to
the discretion of the court. Rule 33 is amended
to make express the authority of the court to
impose sanctions upon the party or upon counsel for the party. This rule does not apply to a
first appeal of right in a criminal case to avoid
the conflict created for appointed counsel by
Anders v. California, 386 US 738 (1967) and

ADDENDUM B
Motor Vehicle Contract of Sale
dated August 1, 1997

SELLER/ DEALER:
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MOTOR VEHICLE CONTRACT OF SALE
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WERNER'S MERCEDES REPAIR
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•ft tarmt. condition!, warrantee and agreements contained herein, including those printed on the reverM $ide hereof
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THIS SECTION FOR SELLERS USE ONLY PERTAINING TO TRAOE-IN

PURCHASE PRICE AND OTHER SUMS DUE

•

Title (il not. explain):

1. CASH PRICE OF VEHICLE
2. ACCESSORIES/OPTIONS
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FINANCING DISCLOSURE

TRADE-IN AND/OR OTHER CREDITS
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YEAR/MAKE
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•BALANCE OWED ON THA OE-IN:
BALANCE OWED TO:
AODRESS:

PAYOFF
VERIFIED BY:

GOOD
UNTIL

DATE OF
VERIFICATION:

ACC.»:

123

10. TRADE-IN ALLOWANCE
11. BALANCE OWED ON TRADE-IN*

17.
18. SUB TOTAL-TAXABLE ITEMS

rPh4}*

(total lines 15-17)

19. TRADE ALLOWANCE (line 10) | /6.5c)

Q

20. NET TAXABLE AMOUNT
(line 18 minus line 19)

o*d

s 5

22. LICENSE & REGISTRATION FEES
23. PROPERTY TAX DUE ON TRADE-IN

.JCBZSZJESS.

jm*»-

25. STATE WASTE TIRE RECYCLING FEE

INTEREST RATE BETWEEN

7--

_% AND

% PER ANNUM. TERM BETWEEN

. MONTHS AND .

MONTHS. MONTHLY PAYMENTS

. PER MONTH ANO $ .

PER MONTH BASEO

ON A OOWN PAYMENT OF $
IF SELLER IS NOT ABLE TO ARRANGE FINANCING WITHIN THE TERMS OISCLOSED. THEN
SELLER MUST. WITHIN SEVEN CALENOAR OAYS OF THE DATE OF SALE. MAIL NOTICE TO THE
PURCHASER THAT HE/SHE HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO ARRANGE FINANCING. PURCHASER THEN
HAS 14 DAYS FROM DATE OF SALE TO ELECT. IF HE/SHE CHOOSES. TO RESCIND THE
CONTRACT OF SALE. PURSUANT TO SECTION 41-3-401
IN OROER TO RESCIND THE CONTRACT OF SALE. THE PURCHASER SHALL:
(1) RETURN TO SELLER THE MOTOR VEHICLE PURCHASER
(2) PAY THE SELLER 30 CENTS FOR EACH MILE THE MOTOR VEHICLE HAS BEEN ORIVEN; ANO
(3) COMPENSATE SELLER FOR ANY PHYSICAL DAMAGE TO THE MOTOR VEHICLE.
IN RETURN. SELLER SHALL GIVE BACK TO THE PURCHASER ALL PAYMENTS OR OTHEF
CONSIDERATION PAID BY THE PURCHASER. INCLUDING ANY OOWN PAYMENT AND ANY
MOTOR VEHICLE TRADED IN. !F THE TRADE-IN HAS BEEN SOLD OR OTHERWISE DISPOSED OF
BEFORE THE PURCHASER RESCINDS THE TRANSACTION. THEN THE SELLER SHALL RETURN
TO THE PURCHASER A SUM EQUIVALENT TO THE ALLOWANCE TOWARO THE PURCHASE
PRICE GIVEN BY THE SELLER FOR THE TRAOE-IN. AS NOTED IN THE OOCUMENT OF SALE.
SIGNING THIS DISCLOSURE DOES NOT PROHIBIT THE PURCHASER FROM SEEKING HIS OWN
FINANCING
SWNArUflC

or- PurcHAsi n

26. FEDERAL LUXURY TAX

juct

27. DEALER DOCUMENTARY SERVICE FEE
28.
29. TOTAL OF ALL ITEMS ABOVE

(lines 16, 21-27)
(line 14)

30. TOTAL CREDITS

31 BALANCE DUE
MONTH.

0

305 5 4
fw*°

21. UTAH SALES/USE TAX ON "TAXABLE AMOUNT*

24. STATE INSPECTION/EMISSIONS TEST

"(B)" THE PURCHASER OF THE MOTOR VEHICLE 0ESCRIBED IN THIS CONTRACT HAS
EXECUTED THE CONTRACT IN RELIANCE UPON THE SELLERS REPRESENTATION THAT
SELLER CAN PROVIOE FINANCING ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE PURCHASE OF THE MOTOR
VEHICLE. THE PRIMARY TERMS OF THE FINANCING ARE AS FOLLOWS:

BETWEEN $

(line 10 minus 11)

15.
18. SERVICE CONTRACT

0AY

PURCHASER AGREES TO ARRANGE FINANCING
•(A)" THE PURCHASER OF THE MOTOR VEHICLE 0ESCRI8E0 IN THIS CONTRACT ACKNOWLEDGES THAT THE SELLER OF THE MOTOR VEHICLE HAS MAOE NO PROMISES. WARRANTIES.
OR REPRESENTATIONS REGAAOING SELLERS ABILITY TO OBTAIN FINANCING FOR THE
PURCHASE OF THE MOTOR VEHICLE FURTHERMORE. PURCHASER UNOERSTANOS THAT IF
FINANCING IS NECESSARY IN OROER FOR THE PURCHASER TO COMPLETE THE P^MENTTERMS OF THIS CONTRACT ALL THE FINANCING ARRANGEMENTS ARE THE SOLE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE PURCHASER
y^ ' \ I

JU^fOO'

lt*5Q$
DEPOSIT/CASH DOWN PAYMENT (omit amt. line 8) 4-4 6 7 - 3 4
(total lines 12 & 13)
TOTAL CREDITS
LL
SUB-TOTAL FROM LINE 9
^l^oo

12. NET ALLOWANCE ON TRADE-IN
14.

INSTRUCTION: One of the two following disclosures, either "A" or 8". must be acknowledged. If
Purchaser agrees to be responsible for financing, or if this is a cash-only or cash-plus-trade-in only
transaction, then Purchaser must sign disclosure "A". If Seller agrees to arrange for financing, then both
Seller and Purchaser must sign disclosure ~B" BY SIGNING. PURCHASER AFFIRMS THAT HE/SHE
HAS REAO THE DISCLOSURE ANO AGREES THERETO IF SIGNING (DISCLOSURE " B " , DO
NOT SIGN UNTIL ALL BLANKS HAVE BEEN FILLED IN.

SELLER AGREES TO ARRANGE F/flANCING

• W A R R A N T Y AS T O BALANCE O W E D O N T R A D E D - I N VEHICLE:
Purchaser warrant* that ha/ aha haa given Sailer a true pay-off amount on any
vehicle traded In, and that if it is not correct and is greater than the amount shown
above. Purchaser will pay the exceaa to Softer on demand

13.

AUfHflfll?AfldN
roa f * r o F f

rVOT/CE ONLY TO BUYERS OF USED VEHICLES

7. MFR. REBATE
(line 6 minus 8)

M6*MfV'

STAT€MMT

The information you see on the window form (Buyer's Guide) (or this vehicle is part of this contract
Information on the window form overrides any contrary provisions in the contract ol sale.
I HAVE; RECEIVED A COPY OF JHE
THE FTTXUSEO
FTTXUSEO CAR
CAR BUYERS GUIDE

6. TOTAL CASH PRICE (add lines 1-5)

9. SUBTOTAL
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Of SIUEA

*'?!&. 34 OTHER TERMS AGREED TO:

NONE^fc.

AS FOLLOWS Q

(total line 29 rwnus 30)
.19-

Purchaser has arranged insurance on vehiclertwough.

. insurance company. Policy I -

As is stated on tha reverse side of this document, unless Seller has given to Purchaser an Express Warranty in writing. Seller makes no Warranty, express or implied, with respect to the merchantability,
fitness lor particular purpose, or otherwise coricerntiq the vehicle, parts or accessories described herein. Unless otherwise indicated in writing, any warranty is limited to that provided by the
manulacturar, II any. as explained and corrtfiwied by Paragraph 4 en the reverse skJe hertof.
^
Purchaser agrees mat this contract includes alt ot the terms, conditions and warranties on both the lace and reverse side hereof, that this agreement cancels and supersedes any prior agreement and as of
the date hereof comprises the complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement relating to the subject matters covered hereby PURCHASER BY HIS/HER EXECUTION OF THIS
AGREEMENT ACKNOWLEDGES THAT HE/SHE HAS REAO ITS TERMS. CONDITIONS ANO WARRANTIES BOTH ON THE FACE ANO THE REVERSE SIOE HEREOF ANO HAS RECEIVED A TRUE
COPY OF THIS AGREEMENT. ANO FURTHER AGREES TO PAY THE 'BALANCE 0 U F SET FORTH ABOVE ON OR BEFORE THE DATE SPECIFIED
SNNATUSf

:/,
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'•fSrrtr-"/
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CONDITIONS ANO WARRANTIES
IT IS FURTHER UNDERSTOOD AND MUTUALLY AGREED:
The agreement on the reverse side hereof is subject to the following terms, conditions, and warranties made by Purchaser, which
have been mutually agreed upon:
1.

Purchaser agrees to deliver the original bill of sale and the title to any used vehicle traded herein along with the delivery of
such vehicle In the same condition and containing the same equipment as when appraised reasonable wear and tear
excepted, and Purchaser warrants such used vehicle to be his property free and clear of ail liens and encumbrances except
as otherwise noted on the reverse side hereof.

2. If the Purchaser does not pay the "BALANCE DUE" by the date indicated on the reverse side of this agreement, then the Seller
may set off against it's damages any cash deposit or down payment received from the Purchaser. In the event a used vehicle
has been taken in trade. Purchaser authorizes Seller to sell the used vehicle, and Seller shall be entitled to reimburse itself out
of the proceeds of such sale for its expenses and losses incurred or suffered as the result of Purchaser's failure to complete
the purchase.
3. Seller shall not be liable for delays or damages caused by the manufacturer, accidents, sureties, fires, or other causes beyond
the control of the Seller.
4. NO WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, ARE MADE OR WILL BE DEEMED TO HAVE BEEN MADE BY EITHER SELLER
OR THE MANUFACTURER OF THE NEW MOTOR VEHICLE OR MOTOR VEHICLE CHASSIS FURNISHED HEREUNDER,
EXCEPTING ONLY THE CURRENT PRINTED WARRANTY APPLICABLE TO SUCH VEHICLE OR VEHICLE CHASSIS,
WHICH WARRANTY IS INCORPORATED HEREIN AND MADE A PART HEREOF AND A COPY OF WHICH WILL BE
DELIVERED TO PURCHASER AT THE TIME OF DELIVERY OF THE NEW MOTOR VEHICLE OR MOTOR VEHICLE
CHASSIS, SUCH WARRANTY SHALL BE EXPRESSLY IN LIEU OF ANY OTHER WARRANTY, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED,
INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY IMPLIED WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
PURPOSE, AND THE REMEDIES SET FORTH IN SUCH WARRANTY WILL BE THE ONLY REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO ANY
PERSON WITH RESPECT TO SUCH NEW MOTOR VEHICLE OR MOTOR VEHICLE CHASSIS.
NO WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, ARE MADE BY SELLER WITH RESPECT TO USED MOTOR VEHICLES OR
MOTOR VEHICLE CHASSIS FURNISHED HEREUNDER EXCEPT AS MAY BE EXPRESSED IN WRITING BY SELLER FOR
SUCH USED MOTOR VEHICLE OR MOTOR VEHICLE CHASSIS, WHICH WARRANTY, IF SO EXPRESSED IN WRITING, IS
INCORPORATED HEREIN AND MADE A PART HEREOF.
5. In case the vehicle sold to Purchaser is a used or demonstrator vehicle, no warranty or representation is made by Seller as to
the extent such vehicle has been used, regardless of the mileage shown on the odometer of said used vehicle.
6. In the event it becomes necessary for Seller to enforce any of the terms, condit.or s or warranties in this agreement, Purchaser
agrees to pay reasonable attorney's fees and court costs.
7. Purchaser may not transfer or assign his/her interest in this Agreement, unless Seller consents in writing.
8. LIABILITY INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR BODILY INJURY AND DAMAGE CAUSED TO OTHERS IS NOT INCLUDED IN THIS
AGREEMENT.
9. Purchaser REPRESENTS that he/she is 18 years of age or older.
10. Purchaser grants to Seller a purchase money security interest in the purchased vehicle and to any proceeds of the vehicle to
secure full payment of the purchase price. This security interest covers all equipment, accessories, and parts that Purchaser
adds to the vehicle. Purchaser also grants Seller a security interest in the proceeds of any physical damage Insurance policy
on the vehicle.
11.

If the vehicle bought by Purchaser is a used vehicle, the information you see on the window form [Buyer's Guide] for this
vehicle is part ot this contract Information on the window form overrides any contrary provisions in this contract of sale.

12. IN THE CASE OF ANY VEHICLE TRADED IN AS PART OF THE CONSIDERATION TOWARD A PURCHASE, PURCHASER
REPRESENTS AND WARRANTS:
(a) THAT, UNLESS OTHERWISE DISCLOSED ON THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF, POLLUTION CONTROL EQUIPMENT,
AIR BAGS AND ALL SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT INSTALLED BY THE MANUFACTURER HAS NOT BEEN
REMOVED OR RENDERED INOPERATIVE:
(b) THAT THE YEAR OF MANUFACTURE AND THE BALANCE OWED ON THE TRADED-IN VEHICLE ARE AS STATED ON
THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF;
(c) THAT, UNLESS OTHERWISE DISCLOSED ON THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF, THE ODOMETER READING ACCURATELY STATES ACTUAL MILES THE TRADED-IN VEHICLE HAS BEEN DRIVEN;
(d) THAT PURCHASER HAS AND WILL PROVIDE TO SELLER GOOD TITLE TO THE TRADED-IN VEHICLE, AND THAT
TRANSFER OF THE TRADED-IN VEHICLE TO SELLER AS A TRADE-IN ON THE PURCHASE OF ANOTHER VEHICLE IS
RIGHTFUL; AND
0 ) THAT THE TRADED-IN VEHICLE HAS NEVER HAD ITS TITLE OR REGISTRATION BRANDED AS "SALVAGED",
"RESTORED," "REPAIRED," OR SIMILAR TERM, PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE ANN. §§41-1a-1004 ANO 41-1a-1005
OR STATUTE(S) OF ANOTHER STATE SUBSTANTIALLY SIMILAR IN CONTENT. IF PURCHASER BREACHES THIS
REPRESENTATION AND WARRANTY THEN PURCHASER AGREES TO BE LIABLE FOR ANO PAY THE SELLER THE
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TRADE-IN ALLOWANCE AS STATED ON THE REVERSE SIDE AND THE REOUCEO
VALUE ATTRIBUTABLE TO MISREPRESENTATION REGARDING THE TITLE OR REGISTRATION.
13. Purchaser also grants the Seller a security interest in the vehicle purchased by Purchaser for the purpose of securing Seller,
against losses proximately caused by Purchaser's breach, if any, of the warranties made in the preceding paragraph.
14. Any written notice required to be given Purchaser if mailed by ordinary mall, postage prepaid, to Purchaser's mailing address
as stated on the reverse side hereof shall be deemed reasonable and effective notification.
15. The rate of interest as set forth in the Financing Disclosure section (B) of the reverse side may involve a variable rate, if therein
noted. Purchaser will rely on any credit agreement representing financing to provide the credit disclosures required by law,
including disclosures regarding variable rates of interest.

ADDENDUM C
Minute Entry of October 29, 1998

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THOMAS D. HARRISON,
Plaintiff,

MINUTE ENTRY
Case No. 980900524 CN

vs
RON DREITZLER, et al
Defendant.

Judge Tyrone E. Medley

Defendant Dreitzler's Motion For Summary Judgment and For Award
of Attorney's Fees and Defendant Werner's Mercedes Repair Inc.'s
Motion For Summary Judgment were taken under advisement by the
Court after the submission of oral argument and memoranda by
counsel. Having reviewed all memoranda in support, opposition,
reply, and supplemental thereto, the Court being fully advised
comes now and rules as follows:
1.

Defendant Dreitzler's and Werner's Mercedes Repair Inc.'s
Motions For Summary Judgment are granted based upon & H of
the reasons, analysis and authorities set forth in
defendant's memoranda in support, reply and supplemental
thereto. Defendant Drietzler's request for an award of
attorney fees is denied.

2.

Plaintiff's Motions in Limine have been rendered moot and/or
denied by implication based upon the ruling referenced
hereinabove.

3.

Counsel for defendants is instructed to prepare findings of
fact, conclusions of law and order granting summary judgment
consistent with this Minute Entry.
Dated this

day of October, 1998.

ADDENDUM D
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
and Order
of February 22, 1999

Third JudteteJ District

LAW OFFICES OF PHILLIP W. DYER
PHILLIP W. DYER (4315)
KEVIN C. TIMKEN (8003)
Attorneys for Defendants
221 Kearns Building
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
(801)363-5000
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, DIVISION I
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THOMAS D. HARRISON,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW re:
DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.
RON DREITZLER and WERNER'S
MERCEDES REPAIR, Inc.,
Civil No, 98-0900524 CN
Defendants.
Judge Tyrone E. Medley
Defendant Ron Dreitzler's Motion for Summary Judgment and
for Award of Attorney's Fees, Defendant Werner's Mercedes Repair,
Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment, and Plaintiff Thomas D.
Harrison's First, Third, and Fourth Motions in Limine came on for
hearing before the Honorable Judge Tyrone E. Medley on the 5**
day of October, 1998, at the hour of 8:30 a.m., the Plaintiff
appearing by and through his counsel, Robert B. Hansen and the
Defendants appearing by and through their counsel, Phillip W.
Dyer.

The Court heard oral argument from Messrs. Dyer and

Hansen, requested supplementary briefing on the issue of part

performance, took the motions under advisement, having received
and reviewed briefing by counsel on the issue of part performance
and issued its Minute Entry on the 29th Day of October, 1998, the
Court hereby enters its
FINDINGS OF FACT
As to Defendant Dreitzler's Motion for Summary Judgment:
1.

On or about January 16, 1998, plaintiff filed his

original Complaint in this matter seeking to enforce an alleged
oral agreement between plaintiff and Defendant Dreitzler whereby
Dreitzler allegedly agreed to indemnify plaintiff as to a bank
loan with Draper Bank and Trust.

That Complaint was asserted

against Defendant Dreitzler individually and not against Werner's
Mercedes Repair, Inc.
2.

Plaintiff's loan with Draper Bank and Trust was in the

amount of $14,000.00 and was secured by a 1987 Mercedes
automobile plaintiff has claimed was traded to defendants.
3.

On or about October 31, 1997, plaintiff entered into a

Change in Terms agreement with Draper Bank and Trust wherein
plaintiff agreed to pay the $14,000.00 loan over a period of two
years.
4.

The loan remained secured by the 1987 Mercedes.
On March 31, 1998, Defendant Dreitzler retained Phillip

W. Dyer to represent him in this matter.

On or about April 10,

1998, Mr. Dyer filed a Motion to Amend seeking to assert an
2

Amended Answer that included an affirmative defense (among many
others) that any alleged agreement was solely between plaintiff
and Werner's Mercedes Repair, Inc., a Utah Corporation in good
standing•
5.

On May 13, 1998, Plaintiff's deposition was taken.

At

that time plaintiff produced two (2) items of correspondence from
plaintiff which were addressed to Werner's Mercedes Repair, Inc.
Both letters pre-date the filing of the Complaint, were copied to
plaintiff's counsel, and are addressed to the corporate
defendant, Werner's Mercedes Repair, Inc.
6.

In his deposition, plaintiff testified that he was aware

he was dealing with a corporate entity (i.e., Werner's) and not
with Dreitzler individually.
7.

In his deposition, plaintiff testified that he

understood the distinction between a corporation and an
individual.
8.

On May 26, 1998, prior to filing Plaintiff's Amended

Complaint, Plaintiff's counsel moved to dismiss Defendant
Dreitzler as being improperly joined as a party defendant.

On

June 3, 1998, Defendant Dreitzler requested attorney's fees in
his Memorandum Regarding Plaintiff's Motion for Dismissal of
Defendant Ron Dreitzler.

On June 22, 1998, Plaintiff's counsel

withdrew his Motion to Dismiss Defendant Dreitzler.
3

9.

Defendant Dreitzler has expended several thousand

dollars defending this matter to date.
As to Defendant Werner's Mercedes Repair, Inc.'s Motion for
Summary Judgment:
1.

Plaintiff and Defendant Werner's signed a Motor Vehicle

Contract of Sale dated August 1, 1997, which listed a 1987
Mercedes under the heading "Trade-in and/or Other Credits."
2.

Plaintiff's deposition testimony was that the Motor

Vehicle Contract of Sale did not reflect the complete agreement
of the parties.
3.

The 1987 Mercedes at issue in this case was never traded

to defendant Werner's but was taken by Werner's on a consignment
basis.
4.

In his deposition testimony, Plaintiff admitted that the

title to the 1987 Mercedes was never transferred to defendant
Werner's as it would have been if the vehicle had in fact been
traded to Werner's.
5.

After the date of the contract, plaintiff's actions were

inconsistent with any possibility that the 1987 Mercedes was a
"trade-in":
a) On July 28, 1997, plaintiff entered into a loan
agreement with Draper Bank and Trust.

Plaintiff borrowed

$14,000.00; the loan was secured in part by the 1987 Mercedes at
issue in this case.

The documents indicate that the primary
4

source of repayment was to be Mr. Harrison's personal income.
Werner's was not a party to this loan agreement.
b) On October 31, 1997, plaintiff entered into a Change
of Terms Agreement with Draper Bank and Trust.

The loan remained

secured in part by the 1987 Mercedes at issue in this case.
Werner's was not a party to this Change in Terms Agreement.
c) On July 28, 1997, plaintiff executed a Power of
Attorney in favor of Draper Bank and Trust in which he averred
that he is the "bona fide registered owner of the following
described motor vehicle:
6.

1987 Mercedes Benz 300 SDL".

Deposition testimony of the loan officer at Draper Bank

and Trust revealed that neither defendants, nor Draper Bank and
Trust, ever treated anyone but plaintiff as the owner of the 1987
Mercedes.
The Court having entered its Findings of Fact, now hereby
makes the following
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
As to Defendant Dreitzler's Motion for Summary Judgment;
1.

Plaintiff's claim alleging an oral agreement to

indemnify is barred by the statute of frauds.

Specifically, the

claim is barred both by Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-4(2) (1998), which
applies to any "promise to answer for the debt, default, or
miscarriage of another" and by § 25-5-4(1) (1998), which applies
5

to "every agreement that by its terms is not to be performed
within one year."

Further, plaintiff's claim is not taken out of

the statute of frauds by any part performance for two reasons.
First, the part performance doctrine is only available where the
statute of frauds is asserted as a defense in a specific
performance action involving real property or unique personalty.
Second, even if the doctrine of part performance were available
to plaintiff, plaintiff has not provided the Court with clear and
convincing evidence showing rhat any alleged part performance is
exclusively referable to the alleged oral agreement.
As to Defendant Werner's Mercedes Repair, Inc.'s Motion for
Summary Judgment:
1.

The contract before the Court is not fully integrated

and the Court must therefore turn to parol evidence to determine
the intent of the parties.

Based on the parol evidence, it is

clear that as a matter of law, the 1987 Mercedes was not traded
in to defendants but has been owned by plaintiff at all times
relevant to this matterDATED this

day of

f

, 199

HONORABLE TYRONE E
STRICT COURT JUDGE
MI\E:\CUen:\Werners\Fin<Jingj of Fact
W.58.00

CERTIFICATE OF SAME DAY SERVICE
STATE OF UTAH

)
)SS.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Kathleen J. Gillman being duly sworn, deposes and says:
That she served

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW res

DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

upon the following

parties by telecopying a true and correct copy thereof addressed
to:
Robert B. Hansen, Esq.
838 18th Avenue
Salt Lake City, Utah
on t h e

2

clay of

322-1796

lj2JJy^ii)-tL^l99Q.
Mf\l{t(Lj^

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

\^A(JU^4U^^

day of

£covf(-~ . 1998.

My Commission expires:

Notary Public
Residing at:
Salt Lake County, Utah
NOTARY PUBLIC

PHILLIP DYER
138 So. Main S t . Sta. 31«
Salt talcs City. Utah 94101
My Commission Exp«M
February 14. 2000
STATE OF UTAH

FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

FEB 2 2 tCC3
SALT

LAW OFFICES OF P H I L L I P W.

OUNTY

DYER

Deputy citric

PHILLIP W. DYER (4315)
KEVIN C. TIMKEN (8003)
Attorneys for Defendants
221 Kearns Building
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
(801)363-5000
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, DIVISION I
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS'
MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT,
DENYING DEFENDANT DREITZLER'S
MOTION FOR AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S
FEES, AND DENYING PLAINTIFF'S
MOTIONS IN LIMINE

THOMAS D. HARRISON,
Plaintiff,
vs.
RON DREITZLER and WERNER'S
MERCEDES REPAIR, Inc.,

Civil No. 98-0900524 CN
Defendants.
Judge Tyrone E. Medley
ORDER
Based upon the arguments of the parties, the Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law heretofore entered, and good cause
appearing therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:

1.

Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment are granted and

plaintiff's entire Amended Complaint is dismissed with prejudice
And on the merits.
2.
denied.

Defendant Ron Dreitzler's Motion for Attorney's Fees is

3.

Plaintiff's Motions in Limine are rendered moot and/or

denied by implication based upon the Court's granting defendants'
Motions for Summary Judgment.
DATED this

J^'^'

day of

\/l)£s&~~

, 1991

THE HONORABLE TYRONE E. MEDj
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

mI\E:\Clicm\Wcmcrs\Orderrc:MSJ
W158.00
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ADDENDUM E
Minute Entry of April 29, 1999

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AMD FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, 8TATE OF UTAH

THOMAS D. HARRISON,

:

MINUTE ENTRY

Plaintiff,

:

CASE NO. 980900524

vs.

:

RON DREITZLER and WERNER'S
MERCEDES REPAIR, INC.,

I
:

Defendants•
:

Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on its Counterclaim
and Motion for Award of Attorney's Fees pursuant to Section 78-2756, Utah Code Ann., are submitted to the Court for decision
pursuant to Rule 4-501. Having reviewed all Memoranda in support,
opposition, and in response thereto, the Court rules as follows:
1.

Defendant's

Motion

for

Summary

Judgment

on

its

Counterclaim is granted, based upon the analysis and authorities
set forth in defendant's Memoranda in support and reply thereto.
2.

Defendant's Motion for Award of Attorney's Fees pursuant

to Section 78-27-56, Utah Code Ann., is denied.

Despite the fact

that the Court was unable to locate a timely filed Memorandum in
Opposition, the Court cannot conclude that plaintiff's defense on
defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment was without merit and not
brought or asserted in good faith.

HARRISON V. DREITZLER

3.

PAGE TWO

MINUTE ENTRY

Counsel for defendant is instructed to prepare Findings,

Conclusions and an Order consistent with this Minute Entry and Rule
4-504(2).
Dated thi

.day of April, 1999.

4<^0F/,T

El

NE E. MEDLEY
ICT COURT JUDGE
<2*

HARRISON V. DREITZLER

PAGE THREE

MINUTE ENTRY

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Minute Entry, to the following, this,

.day of April,

1999:

Robert B. Hansen
Attorney for Plaintiff
838 18th Avenue
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
Phillip W. Dyer
Kevin C. Timken
Attorneys for Defendants
136 S. Main, Suite 221
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

5^°v<-

ADDENDUM F
Stipulation for Dismissal of Initial Appeal
of May 4, 1999

Robert B. Hansen #1344
Attorney for Plaintiff
S38- 18th Avenue
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
Telephone: (801) 322-1796
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
Thomas D. Harrison

STIPULATION AND ORDER

Plaintiff and Appellant
v.
Ron Dreitzler and Warner's Mercedes Repair, Inc.

Case No. 990255-SC

Defendants and Appellees
The parties hereto have agreed upon the sum of $728.68 (Seven Hundred Twenty Eight
Dollars and Sixty Eight Cents) to be paid by Plaintiff to Defendants as damages as a condition of
a voluntary dismissal of this appeal, and said sum having been paid, it is hereby stipulated that this
appeal should be dismissed in accordance with Rule 37(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedures, and also that the following order should be signed and entered accordingly.
Dated this ?<-day of May, 1999.

Robert B. Hansen
Attorney for Plaintiff and Appellant

Phillip W. Dyer
Attorney for Defendants and Appellees

ADDENDUM G
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
and Order
of July 14, 1999

FIUO DISTRICT C3i i ; j
Third Judicfa! Disi ;«t
JUL 1 4 1320

UGL.
OaputyC-,.-

LAW OFFICES OF PHILLIP W. DYER
PHILLIP W. DYER (4315)
KEVIN C. TIMKEN (8003)
Attorneys for Defendants
221 Kearns Building
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
(801)363-5000
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, DIVISION I
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THOMAS D. HARRISON,
Plainriff,

vs.

)
)
)
)
I
\

RON DREITZLER and WERNER'S
MERCEDES REPAIR, Inc.,

]
)

Defendants.

;

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW re:
DEFENDANT WERNER'S MERCEDES
REPAIR, INC.'S, MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND MOTION
FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES

Civil No. 98-0900524 CN
Judge Tyrone E. Medley
Defendant Werner's Mercedes Repair, Inc.'s (Werner's) Motion
for Summary Judgment and Motion for Attorney's Fees were
submitted for decision pursuant to Notices to Submit for Decision
dated April 19, 1999.

The Court having reviewed Werner's Motion

for Summary Judgment, Werner's Memorandum of Points and
Authorities in Support of that Motion, Plaintiff's Memorandum of
Points and Authorities in Opposition to that Motion, and Werner's
Reply Memorandum in Further Support of that Motion, as well as
Werner's Motion for Attorney's Fees and Werner's Memorandum of
Points and Authorities in Support of that Motion, issued a Minute

Entry dated April 29, 1999, regarding the Defendant's pending
motions and good cause appearing therefor, the Court hereby makes
and enters its
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Plaintiff and Defendant Werner's signed a Motor Vehicle

Contract of Sale dated August 1, 1997, which listed a 1987
Mercedes under the heading "Trade-in and/or Other Credits."
2.

Plaintiff's deposition testimony was that the Motor

Vehicle Contract of Sale did not reflect the complete agreement
of the parties.
3.

The 1987 Mercedes at issue in this case was never

traded-in by Plaintiff to defendant Werner's but was taken by
Werner's on a consignment basis.
4.

In his deposition testimony, Plaintiff admitted that the

title to the 1987 Mercedes was never transferred to defendant
Werner's as it would have been if the vehicle had, in fact, been
traded to Werner's.
5.

After the dare of the contract, plaintiff's actions were

inconsistent with any possibility that the 1987 Mercedes was a
"trade-in":
a) On July 28, 1997, plaintiff entered into a loan
agreement with Draper iBank and Trust.

Plaintiff borrowed

314,000.00; the loan was secured in part by the 1987 Mercedes at
2

issue in this case.

The documents indicate that the primary

source of repayment was to be Mr, Harrison's personal income.
Werner's was not a party to this loan agreement.
b) On October 31, 1997, plaintiff entered into a Change
of Terms Agreement with Draper Bank and Trust.

The loan remained

secured in part by the 19 87 Mercedes at issue in this case.
Werner's was not a party to this Change in Terms Agreement.
c) On July 28, 1997, plaintiff executed a Power of
Attorney in favor of Draper Bank and Trust in which he averred
that he is the "bona fide registered owner of the following
described motor vehicle:
6.

1987 Mercedes Benz 300 SDL".

Deposition testimony of the loan officer at Draper Bank

and Trust, one Patty Householder, revealed that neither
defendants, nor Draper Bank and Trust, has ever treated anyone
but plaintiff as the owner of the 1987 Mercedes.
7.

When the 1987 Mercedes did not sell on a consignment

basis, the sum of $878.16 in additional sales tax became due
incident to Plaintiff's purchase of the 1991 Mercedes.

Defendant

Werner's was required to pay that additional sales tax on
Plaintiff's behalf and is entitled to reimbursement for the sales
taxes paid but owed by Plaintiff incident to Plaintiff's purchase
of the 1991 Mercedes.
8.

Despite the fact that the Court was unable to locate a
3

timely filed Memorandum in Opposition, the Court cannot find that
Plaintiff's defense on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment
was without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith.
The Court having entered its Findings of Fact, now hereby
makes the following
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The contract before the Court is not fully integrated

and the Court must therefore turn to parol evidence to determine
the intent of the parties.

Based on the parol evidence, it is

clear that as a matter of law, the 1987 Mercedes was not traded
in to defendants but has been owned by plaintiff at all times
relevant to this matter.
2.

Because Werner's was forced to pay 5878.16 in additional

sales tax owed by Plaintiff incident to the purchase of the 1991
Mercedes, Defendant Werner's is entitled to judgment against
Plaintiff in the amount of $878.16.
3.

Defendant Werner1s Motion for Attorney's Fees should be

denied.
DATED this

n

day of

^yF^V

1999.

s^U^(L
IE filfcNORABLE TYRONE E
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
M!VE.\Cienr. Werners'-.Findings of Fact 2 W158 00

« « 0 DISTRICT COURT

IMAGED
LAW OFFICES OF PHILLIP W. DYER
PHILLIP W. DYER (4315)
KEVIN C. TIMKEN (8003)
Attorneys for Defendants
221 Kearns Building
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
(801)363-5000

JUL / 4 1999

ENTERED IN REGISTRY
OF JUQGK'-ifN'S
DATE

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, DIVISION I
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT
WERNER'S MERCEDES REPAIR,
INC.'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT, DENYING WERNER'S
MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES

THOMAS D. HARRISON,
Plaintiff,
vs.

and
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF WERNER'S
AND AGAINST THOMAS HARRISON

RON DREITZLER and WERNER'S
MERCEDES REPAIR, Inc.,

Civil No. 98-0900524 CN

Defendants.

Judge Tyrone E. Medley
ORDER
Based upon the memoranda of the parties, the Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law heretofore entered, and good cause
appearing therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:

1.

Defendant Werner's Mercedes Repair, Inc.'s (Werner's),

Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.
2.

Defendant Werner's Motion for Attorney's Fees is .denied.

3.

Judgment is granted in favor of Werner's Mercedes

Repair, Inc., and against Thomas Harrison in the sum of $878.16.
Interest shall accrue on the unpaid amount of the judgment at the
judgment rate of 6.513%.
AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT THIS JUDGMENT SHALL BE
AUGMENTED IN THE AMOUNT OF REASONABLE COSTS EXPENDED IN
COLLECTING SAID JUDGMENT BY EXECUTION OR OTHERWISE AS SHALL BE
ESTABLISHED BY AFFIDAVIT.
DATED this

/y

day of

V?^^

, 1999,

IONORABLE TYRONE E
COURT JUDGE

MI\E:\Client\Wemeis\Orderre:MSJ:
W158.00
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ADDENDUM H
Docketing Statement of August 3, 1999

Robert B. Hansen #1344
Attorney for Plaintiff
838 - 18* Avenue
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
Telephone: (801) 322-1796
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

DOCKETING STATEMENT

Thomas D. Harrison
Plaintiff and Appellant
v.
Ron Dreitzler and Warner's Mercedes Repair, Inc. Defendants and Appellees

Case No.

:

1.

Date of entry of order appealed

from:

July 14, 1999.

2.

Nature of post judgement motion(s) and date(s)

3.

Date and effect of order(s) disposing of post judgement motion(s):

4.

Date offilingof notice of appeal:

5.

Jurisdiction:
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Section 102-2(j) Utah Annotated 1953, as amended.

6.

Name of the trial court:
County, State of Utah.

7.

Statement o f facts:

filed:

None.
None.

July 26, 1999.

District Court of Third Judicial District in and for Salt Lake

Plaintiff purchased from Defendant Ron Dreitzler, President of Defendant Warner's
Mercedes Repair, a 1991 Mercedes Benz 350-SDL automobile pursuant to a Contract of Sale
dated August 1, 1997.
Said Contract of Sale provided for a vehicle purchase price of $21,500.00, together with
Sales Tax and fees of $469.34, for a total sales price of $21,969.34. Said Contract of Sale further
provided for vehicle trade-in credits to Plaintiff of $16,500.00 for two vehicles Plaintiff traded in
to Defendants as part of the purchase price, to wit: a 1989 Dodge Grand Caravan van for
$2,500.00, and a 1987 Mercedes Benz 300-SDL for $14,000.00. The additional amount due
Defendants under the Contract of Sale, of $5,469.34, was paid by Plaintiff to Defendants in three
personal checks totaling $5,469.34.

As a part of the sales transaction, Plaintiff obtained in his own name, for Defendants use,
a $ 14,000.00 flooring loan from Draper Bank, as Defendant Ron Dreitzler had been unable to
obtain a flooring loan on the 1987 Mercedes trade-in from his own bank, Zion's Bank, and he
needed Plaintiffs flooring loan in order to accept Plaintiffs Mercedes as a trade-in, as
subsequently spelled out in the Contract of Sale dated August 1,1997, without adversely
affecting his business cash flow. Accordingly, Defendant Ron Dreitzler had verbally agreed to
pay back said Draper Bank flooring loan immediately upon his sale of the 1987 Mercedes
Plaintiff had traded in.
Four months after the sale, Defendant Ron Dreitzler advised Plaintiff by telephone that he
could not sell the 1987 Mercedes trade-in for the $14,000.00 trade-in allowance he had granted
Plaintiff in the said August 1, 1997, Contract of Sale, and accordingly asked Plaintiff to take less
money. Plaintiff responded to Defendant Ron Dreitzler that the 1987 Mercedes was not his
vehicle any more, that it belonged to Defendants as spelled out in the said Contract of Sale.
Plaintiff's only concern was that Defendants pay the Draper Bank flooring loan in full, which
Defendant Ron Dreitzler had agreed to do as soon as he sold the 1987 Mercedes trade-in vehicle.
Defendant Ron Dreitzler responded by parking said Mercedes trade-in vehicle in the Draper Bank
parking lot and then telling Plaintiff that the sale had really been a consignment sale of the 1987
Mercedes and not a trade-in sale as spelled out in the Contract of Sale. No consignment
agreement was ever discussed, or executed, as required by law before any dealer can legally drive
a consigned vehicle. Defendant Ron Dreitzler then refused to pay off any of the Draper Bank
flooring loan or loan interest.
As a result of Defendant Ron Dreitzler not paying back the Draper Bank flooring loan that
Plaintiff had previously provided for him, Plaintiff has paid $14,000.00 too much on the August 1,
1997 Contract of Sale, and is entitled to a $14,000.00 refund together with interest, attorneys fees
and costs.
8.

Issues for review and standard for review:
Issues: (1) Whether the Court's determination that there are no genuine issues of a
material fact that exist, is correct, (2) Whether defendants are entitled to a
judgement as a matter of law, (3) Whether any consignment to an automobile
dealer must be in writing to be enforceable under UCA, Section 41-3-801 et seq,
under the facts in this case.

Standard of review correctness see Transamerica Cash Reserve Inc. v. Dixie Power and
Water, Inc. 789 P.2d 24 (IJtah, 1990), Republic Group 883 P.2d at 288-89, Oquirrh Assoc.
v. First National Leasing Company 888 P.2d 659, 662 (UtahApp. 1994), HolbrookCo. v.
Adams 542 P.2d 191,193 (Utah 1975).
On the issue of Standard of Review in summary judgement cases, this Court said in Hardy
v. Prudential Insurance Co. Of America 763 P.2d 761 (Utah 1988):
STANDARD OF REVIEW
After reviewing the facts in the light most favorable
to appellant, if we conclude there is a dispute as to a material

issue of feet, we must reverse the trial court's determination
and remand to the trial court on that issue. Atlas, 737 P. 2d
at 229; Denison, 748 P. 2d at 590. Courts cannot weigh
disputed material facts in ruling on a summary judgement
motion. Spor v. Crested Butte Silver Mining, Inc., 740? 2d
1304, 1308 (Utah 1987), Oberhansly v. Sprouse, 751 P 2d
1155, 1157 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). "It is of no moment that
the evidence on one side may appear to be strong or even
compelling." Spor, 740 P. 2d at 1308; Oberhansly, 751 P. 2d at
1157. "It only takes one competent sworn statement under oath
to dispute the averments on the other side of the controversy
and create an issue of feet." W. M. Barnes Co. v. Sohio
Natural Resources Co., 627', P. 2d 56, 59 (Utah 1981) quoting
HolbrookCo. v. Adams, 542P. 2d 191, 193 (Utah 1975).

9.

Determinative law: Cite determinative statues, rules and cases: Rule 56, U.R.C.P. and all
cases cited above.

10.

Related appeal: None.

11.

Attachments: Attached to each copy of the docketing statement shall be a copy of the
following:
a) The judgement or order sought to be removed:

Attached.

b) Any opinions of findings: Attached
c) All motionsffledpursuant to Rule 50 (a) and (b), 52 (b), 54 (b), and 59 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. None.
d) The notice of appeal and any order extending the time for filing of a notice of
appeal: Attached and none, respectively.

Dated this 3rd day of August, 1999

s^U^ti-tL^^
Robert B. Hansen,
Attorney for Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

Robert B. Hansen hereby certifies:
That he served Plaintiffs Docketing Statement upon the following parties by placing a
true and correct copy thereof in an envelope addressed to:
Law Offices of Phillip W. Dyer
Phillip W. Dyer and Kevin C. Timken,
Attorneys for Defendants
221 Kearns Building
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84101

and depositing the same, sealed, in the United States Mail at Salt Lake City, Utah, first class
postage prepaid thereon, on the 3rd day of August, 1999.

cbj4Lsu~4JL~~/

Robert B. Hansen,
Attorney for Plaintiff

m£0DIST«JCT COURT
™<rd Judicial Dlsirfct

IMAGED
LAW OFFICES OF PHILLIP W. DYER
PHILLIP W. DYER (4315)
KEVIN C. TIMKEN (8003)
Attorneys for Defendants
221 Kearns Building
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
(801)363-5000

JUL I k 1999

ENTERED IN REGISTRY
Or J U D 3 W ^ * S
•7 / > \ f ^

DATE

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, DIVISION I
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT
WERNER'S MERCEDES REPAIR,
INC.'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT, DENYING WERNER'S
MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES

THOMAS D. HARRISON,
Plaintiff,
vs.

and
RON DREITZLER and WERNER'S
MERCEDES REPAIR, Inc.,

JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF WERNER'S
AND AGAINST THOMAS HARRISON
Civil No. 98-0900524 CN

Defendants.

Judge Tyrone E. Medley
ORDER
Based upon the memoranda of the parties, the Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law heretofore entered, and good cause
appearing therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
1.

Defendant Werner's Mercedes Repair, Inc.'s (Werner's),

Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.
2.

Defendant Werner's Motion for Attorney's Fees is denied,

3-

Judgment is granted in favor of Werner's Mercedes

Repair, Inc., and against Thomas Harrison in the sum of $878.16.
Interest shall accrue on the unpaid amount of the judgment at the
judgment rate of 6.513%.
AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT THIS JUDGMENT SHALL BE
AUGMENTED IN THE AMOUNT OF REASONABLE COSTS EXPENDED IN
COLLECTING SAID JUDGMENT BY EXECUTION OR OTHERWISE AS SHALL BE
ESTABLISHED BY AFFIDAVIT.
DATED this

4-

day of

, 1999.

IONORABLE TYRONE E
COURT JUDGE

MP EACiJcnt\WcmcTS\0rierre:MS;2
Wl 58.00
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
STATE OF UTAH

)
)Ss,
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Kathleen J. Gillman being duly sworn, deposes and says:
That she served

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT WERNER'S MERCEDES

REPAIR, INC.'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, DENYING WERNER'S
MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES and JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF WERNER'S AND
AGAINST THOMAS HARRISON

upon the following party by placing a

true and correct copy in an envelope addressed to:
Robert B, Hansen, Esq.
838 18th Avenue
Salt Lake City, Utah
and causing the same, sealed, to be hand delivered on the
da

Y

of

^ xfltX-^/

1999.

\QJHXXJUK
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this
^^j

k^iirt. y^r
J/P

day of

/ 1999.

My Commission expires:
tP'/V-'Jifrif

Notary Public
Residing at:
Salt Lake County, Utah

NOT A f t / ? U B L l < f " l
I -*>; rr-.*~''t
| X->—Sy
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rfr-n-ry 14. 2000

STATE OF UTAH ^

FltfD DISTRICT C3i
ThirdJudicIa! Disi ;cV*
JUL J 4 13S3
SAUCWCECOUNr,

Q£

*
L A W O F F I C E S OF PHILLIP W. DYER
PHILLIP W. DYER (4315)
KEVIN C. TIMKEN (8003)
A t t o r n e y s for Defendants
221 Kearns Building
136 South Main Street
Salt L a k e C i t y , Utah
84101
(801)363-5000

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT C O U R T , D I V I S I O N I
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THOMAS D.

HARRISON,
Plaintiff,

vs .

I
)
)
)
|
)

RON DREITZLER and WERNER'S
M E R C E D E S REPAIR, Inc.,

)

Defendants.

;

FINDINGS OF F A C T AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW r e :
DEFENDANT W E R N E R ' S M E R C E D E S
REPAIR, I N C . ' S , M O T I O N FOR
SUMMARY J U D G M E N T A N D M O T I O N
FOR A T T O R N E Y ' S FEES

Civil N o . 98-0900524

CN

Judge Tyrone E . Medley

Defendant Werner's Mercedes Repair, Inc.'s

(Werner's)

Motion

for Summary Judgment and Motion for Attorney's Fees w e r e
submitted

for decision pursuant to Notices to Submit for

dated A p r i l 19, 1999.

The Court having reviewed W e r n e r ' s

for Summary Judgment, Werner's Memorandum of P o i n t s
Authorities

Decision
Motion

and

in Support of that M o t i o n , P l a i n t i f f s M e m o r a n d u m

Points and Authorities in Opposition to that M o t i o n , and

of

Werner's

Reply Memorandum in Further Support of that M o t i o n , as w e l l

as

W e r n e r ' s Motion for Attorney's Fees and W e r n e r ' s M e m o r a n d u m

of

Points and Authorities in Support of that M o t i o n , issued a M i n u t e

Entry dated April 29, 1999, regarding the Defendant's pending
motions and good cause appearing therefor, the Court hereby makes
and enters its
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Plaintiff and Defendant Werner's signed a Motor Vehicle

Contract of Sale dated August 1, 1997, which listed a 1987
Mercedes under the heading "Trade-in and/or Other Credits."
2.

Plaintiff's deposition testimony was that the Motor

Vehicle Contract of Sale did not reflect the complete agreement
of the parties.
3.

The 1987 Mercedes at issue in this case was never

traded-in by Plaintiff to defendant Werner's but was taken by
Werner's on a consignment basis.
4.

In his deposition testimony, Plaintiff admitted that the

title to the 1987 Mercedes was never transferred to defendant
Werner's as it would have been if the vehicle had, in fact, been
traded to Werner's.
5.

After the dare of the contract, plaintiff's actions were

inconsistent with any possibility that the 1987 Mercedes was a
"trade-in":
a) On July 28, 1997, plaintiff entered into a loan
agreement with Draper 3ank and Trust.

Plaintiff borrowed

$14,000.00; the loan was secured in part by the 1987 Mercedes at
2

issue in this case.

The documents indicate that the primary

source of repayment was to be Mr, Harrison's personal income.
Werner's was not a party to this loan agreement.
b) On October 31, 1997, plaintiff entered into a Change
of Terms Agreement with Draper Bank and Trust.

The loan remained

secured in part by the 19 87 Mercedes at issue in this case.
Werner's was not a party to this Change in Terms Agreement.
c) On July 28, 1997, plaintiff executed a Power of
Attorney in favor of Draper Bank and Trust in which he averred
that he is the "bona fide registered owner of the following
described motor vehicle:
6.

1987 Mercedes Benz 300 SDL".

Deposition testimony of the loan officer at Draper Bank

and Trust, one Patty Householder, revealed that neither
defendants, nor Draper Bank and Trust, has ever treated anyone
but plaintiff as the owner of the 1987 Mercedes.
7.

When the 1987 Mercedes did not sell on a consignment

basis, the sum of $878.16 in additional sales tax became due
incident to Plaintiff's purchase of the 1991 Mercedes.

Defendant

Werner's was required to pay that additional sales tax on
Plaintiff's behalf and is entitled to reimbursement for the sales
taxes paid but owed by Plaintiff incident to Plaintiff's purchase
of the 1991 Mercedes.
8.

Despite the fact that the Court was unable to locate a
3

timely filed Memorandum in Opposition, the Court cannot find that
Plaintiff's defense on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment
was without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith.
The Court having entered its Findings of Fact, now hereby
makes the following
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The contract before the Court is not fully integrated

and the Court must therefore turn to parol evidence to determine
the intent of the parties.

Based on the parol evidence, it is

clear that as a matter of law, the 1987 Mercedes was not traded
in to defendants but has been owned by plaintiff at all times
relevant to this matter.
2.

Because Werner's was forced to pay 5878.16 in additional

sales tax owed by Plaintiff incident to the purchase of the 1991
Mercedes, Defendant Werner's is entitled to judgment against
Plaintiff in the amount of $878.16.
3.

Defendant Werner's Motion for Attorney's Fees should be

denied.
DATED this

11

day of

S^'V

^c^^

1999,

iE itoNORABLE TYRONE E.
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
MI \ E:\CIien!\ Werners '.Findings of Fact 2/W158 00
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IH AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THOMAS D. HARRISON,

:

MINUTE ENTRY

Plaintiff,

:

CASE NO. 980900524

vs.

:

RON DREITZLER and WERNER* 8
MERCEDES REPAIR, INC.,

I
:

Defendants.

Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on its counterclaim
and Motion for Award of Attorneyfs Fees pursuant to Section 78-2756, Utah code Ann., are submitted to the Court for decision
pursuant to Rule 4-501. Having reviewed all Memoranda in support,
opposition, and in response thereto, the Court rules as follows:
1.

Defendant's

Motion

for

Summary

Judgment

on

its

Counterclaim is granted, based upon the analysis and authorities
set forth in defendant's Memoranda in support and reply thereto.
2.

Defendant's Motion for Award of Attorney's Fees pursuant

to Section 78-27-56, Utah Code Ann., is denied.

Despite the fact

that the Court was unable to locate a timely filed Memorandum in
Opposition, the Court cannot conclude that plaintiff's defense on
defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment was without merit and not
brought or asserted in good faith.

HARRISON V. DREITZLER

3.

MINUTE ENTRY

PAGE TWO

Counsel for defendant is instructed to prepare Findings,

Conclusions and an Order consistent with this Minute Entry and Rule
4-504(2).
Dated thisC-7

da

V

of

April, 1999.

,<"{-OF,;£

L

NE E. MEDLEY
ICT COURT JUDGE

HARRISON V. DREITZLER

PAGE THREE

MINUTE ENTRY

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Minute Entry, to the following, this c^T^
1999:

Robert B. Hansen
Attorney
for Plaintiff
838 18th Avenue
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
Phillip W. Dyer
Kevin C. Timken
Attorneys for Defendants
136 s. Main, Suite 221
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

dav of April,

NOTICE OF APPEAL
Robert B. Hansen #1344
Attorney for Plaintiff
838- 18th Avenue
Salt Lake City, UT 84103
Telephone: (801)322-1796
IN THE DISTRICT COURT
OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH

—ooOoo-

Thomas D. Harrison,
Plaintiff and Appellant
NOTICE OF APPEAL
v.
Ron Dreitzler and Werner's Mercedes
Repair, Inc.

Trial Court No. CV 98-0900524CN
Appellate Case No.

Defendants and Appellees

Notice is hereby given that Thomas D. Harrison appeals to the Utah Supreme Court the
Final Order granting Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgement, of the Honorable Tyrone E.
Medley, entered in the above-entitled case on July 14,1999.
The appeal is taken from the Whole of the Order.
\Ce>-L^s3r
teD
Robert B. Hansen
Attorney for Plaintiff

r^^-^-^gn^^

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

Robert B. Hansen hereby certifies:
That he served Plaintiff's SMriHIiHplMBtttft upon the following parties by placing a
true and correct copy thereof in an envelope addressed to:
Law Offices of Phillip W. Dyer
Phillip W. Dyer and Kevin C. Timken,
Attorneys for Defendants
221 Kearns Building
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84101

and depositing the same, sealed, in the United States Mail at Salt Lake City, Utah, first class
postage prepaid thereon, on the^Bt day o6flBB^ 1999.

Robert B. Hansen, Attorney for Plaintiff

ADDENDUM I
Amended Docketing Statement of August 30, 1999

Robert B. Hansen #1344
Attorney for Plaintiff
838 -18th Avenue
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
Telephone: (801) 322-1796
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
Thomas D. Harrison

Plaintiff and Appellant

:

AMENDED DOCKETING
STATEMENT

:
:

(This Case has been assigned by the
Supreme Court to the Court of
Appeals, by Order dated August 25,
1999)

v.
Ron Dreitzler and Warner's Mercedes Repair, Inc.

Case No. 99-0659

Defendants and Appellees
1.

Date of entry of orders appealed

from:

July 14, 1999, and February 22, 1999.

2.

Nature of post judgement motion(s) and date(s) filed:

3-

Date and effect of order(s) disposing of post judgement motion(s):

4.

Date offilingof notice of appeal:

5.

Jurisdiction:
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Section 102-2(j) Utah Annotated 1953, as amended.

6.

Name of the trial court:
County, State of Utah.

7.

Statement of facts:

None.
None.

July 26, 1999.

District Court of Third Judicial District in and for Salt Lake

Plaintiff purchased from Defendant Ron Dreitzler, President of Defendant Warner's
Mercedes Repair, a 1991 Mercedes Benz 350-SDL automobile pursuant to a Contract of Sale
dated August 1, 1997.
Said Contract of Sale provided for a vehicle purchase price of $21,500.00, together with
Sales Tax and fees of $469.34, for a total sales price of $21,969.34. Said Contract of Sale further
provided for vehicle trade-in credits to Plaintiff of $16,500.00 for two vehicles Plaintiff traded in
to Defendants as part of the purchase price, to wit: a 1989 Dodge Grand Caravan van for

$2,500.00, and a 1987 Mercedes Benz 300-SDL for $14,000.00. The additional amount due
Defendants under the Contract of Sale, of $5,469.34, was paid by Plaintiff to Defendants in three
personal checks totaling $5,469.34.
As a part of the sales transaction, Plaintiff obtained in his own name, for Defendants use,
a $14,000.00 flooring loan from Draper Bank, as Defendant Ron Dreitzler had been unable to
obtain a flooring loan on the 1987 Mercedes trade-in from his own bank, Zion's Bank, and he
needed Plaintiffs flooring loan in order to accept Plaintiffs Mercedes as a trade-in, as
subsequently spelled out in the Contract of Sale dated August 1, 1997, without adversely
affectin2g his business cash flow. Accordingly, Defendant Ron Dreitzler had verbally agreed to
pay back said Draper Bank flooring loan immediately upon his sale of the 1987 Mercedes
Plaintiff had traded in.
Four months after the sale, Defendant Ron Dreitzler advised Plaintiff by telephone that he
could not sell the 1987 Mercedes trade-in for the $14,000.00 trade-in allowance he had granted
Plaintiff in the said August 1, 1997, Contract of Sale, and accordingly asked Plaintiff to take less
money. Plaintiff responded to Defendant Ron Dreitzler that the 1987 Mercedes was not his
vehicle any more, that it belonged to Defendants as spelled out in the said Contract of Sale.
Plaintiff's only concern was that Defendants pay the Draper Bank flooring loan in fiill, which
Defendant Ron Dreitzler had agreed to do as soon as he sold the 1987 Mercedes trade-in vehicle.
Defendant Ron Dreitzler responded by parking said Mercedes trade-in vehicle in the Draper Bank
parking lot and then telling Plaintiff that the sale had really been a consignment sale of the 1987
Mercedes and not a trade-in sale as spelled out in the Contract of Sale. No consignment
agreement was ever discussed, or executed, as required by law before any dealer can legally drive
a consigned vehicle. Defendant Ron Dreitzler then refused to pay off any of the Draper Bank
flooring loan or loan interest.
As a result of Defendant Ron Dreitzler not paying back the Draper Bank flooring loan that
Plaintiff had previously provided for him, Plaintiff has paid $14,000.00 too much on the August 1,
1997 Contract of Sale, and is entitled to a $14,000.00 refimd together with interest, attorneys fees
and costs.
8.

Issues for review and standard for review:
Issues: (1) Whether the Court's determination that there are no genuine issues of a
material fact that exist, is correct, (2) Whether defendants are entitled to a
judgement as a matter of law, (3) Whether any consignment to an automobile
dealer must be in writing to be enforceable under UCA, Section 41-3-801 et seq,
under the facts in this case.

Standard of review correctness see Transamerica Cash Reserve Inc. v. Dixie Power and
Water, Inc. 1%9 P.2d 24 (Utah, 1990), Republic Group 883 P.2d at 288-89, Oquirrh Assoc.
v. First National Leasing Company 888 P.2d 659, 662 (UtahApp. 1994), HolbrookCo. v.
Adams 542 P.2d 191,193 (Utah 1975).
On the issue of Standard of Review in summary judgement cases, this Court said in Hardy
v. Prudential Insurance Co. Of America 763 P.2d 761 (Utah 1988):
2

STANDARD OF REVIEW
After reviewing the facts in the light most favorable
to appellant, if we conclude there is a dispute as to a material
issue of fact, we must reverse the trial court's determination
and remand to the trial court on that issue. Atlas, 737 P. 2d
at 229; Denison, 748 P. 2d at 590. Courts cannot weigh
disputed material facts in ruling on a summary judgement
motion. Spor v. Crested Butte Silver Mining, Inc., 740 P2d
1304, 1308 (Utah 1987), Oberhansly v. Sprouse, 751 P 2d
1155, 1157 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). "It is of no moment that
the evidence on one side may appear to be strong or even
compelling." Spor, 740 P. 2d at 1308; Oberhansly, 751 P. 2d at
1157. "It only takes one competent sworn statement under oath
to dispute the averments on the other side of the controversy
and create an issue of fact."
W. M. Barnes Co. v. Sohio
Natural Resources Co., 627, P. 2d 56, 59 (Utah 1981) quoting
HolbrookCo. v. Adams, 542 P. 2d 191, 193 (Utah 1975).

Determinative law: Cite determinative statues, rules and cases: Rule 56, U.R.C.P. and all
cases cited above.

Related appeal:

None.

Attachments: Attached to each copy of the docketing statement shall be a copy of the
following:
a) The judgement or orders sought to be reviewed:

Attached.

b) Any opinions or findings: Attached
c) All motions filed pursuant to Rule 50 (a) and (b), 52 (b), 54 (b), and 59 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. None.
d) The notice of appeal and any order extending the time for filing of a notice of
appeal: Attached and none, respectively.

Dated this 30th day of August, 1999

Robert B. Hansen,
Attorney for Plaintiff
3

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

Robert B. Hansen hereby certifies:
That he served Plaintiffs Amended Docketing Statement upon the following parties by
placing a true and correct copy thereof in an envelope addressed to:
Law Offices of Phillip W. Dyer
Phillip W. Dyer and Kevin C. Timken,
Attorneys for Defendants
221 Kearns Building
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
and depositing the same, sealed, in the United States Mail at Salt Lake City, Utah, first class
postage prepaid thereon, on the 30th day of August, 1999.

^ KCJJ^UJ- d.
Robert B. Hansen,
Attorney for Plaintiff

P4^!UCJ^^^
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NOTICE OF APPEAL

p" ^. e n
1 ..

• - * v. J

Robert B. Hansen #1344
Attorney for Plaintiff
838-18 th Avenue
Salt Lake City, UT 84103
Telephone: (801) 322-1796
IN THE DISTRICT COURT
OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH

—ooOoo—

Thomas D. Harrison,
Plaintiff and Appellant
NOTICE OF APPEAL

Ron Dreitzler and Werner's Mercedes
Repair, Inc.

Trial Court No. CV 98-0900524CN
Appellate Case No.

Defendants and Appellees

Notice is hereby given that Thomas D. Harrison appeals to the Utah Supreme Court the
Final Order granting Defendants5 Motions for Summary Judgement, of the Honorable Tyrone E.
Medley, entered in the above-entitled case on July 14,1999.
The appeal is taken from the Whole of the Order.

o^t^iA^A

Robert B. Hansen
Attorney for Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

Robert B. Hansen hereby certifies:
That he served PlaintifFs S n d M a p i M t t M i K upon the following parties by placing a
true and correct copy thereof in an envelope addressed to:
Law Offices of Phillip W. Dyer
Phillip W. Dyer and Kevin C. Timken,
Attorneys for Defendants
221 Kearns Building
13 6 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84101

and depositing the same, sealed, in the United States Mail at Salt Lake City, Utah, first class
postage prepaid thereon, on the^flt day o £ 0 M % 1999.

Robert B* Hansen, Attorney for Plaintiff

FILED 0ISTMCT COURT
Third Judicial District

FEB 2 2 :CC3
SALT H K E COUNTY

syLAW OFFICES OF PHILLIP W. DYER
PHILLIP W. DYER (4315)
KEVIN C. TIMKEN (8003)
Attorneys for Defendants
221 Kearns Building
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Ucah 84101
(301)363-5000

^

"

0«putyci*k

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, DIVISION I
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS'
MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT,
DENYING DEFENDANT DREITZLER'S
MOTION FOR AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S
FEES, AND DENYING PLAINTIFF'S
MOTIONS IN LIMINE

THOMAS D. HARRISON,
Plaintiff,
vs.
RON DREITZLER and WERNER'S
MERCEDES REPAIR, Inc.,

Civil No. 98-0900524 CN
Defendants.
Judge Tyrone E. Medley
ORDER
Based upon the arguments of the parties, the Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law heretofore entered, and good cause
appearing therefore,
IT IS HERE3Y ORDERED, ADJUDGE"."./ AND DECREED as follows:

1.

Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment are granted and

plaintiff's entire Amended Complaint is dismissed with prejudice
and on the merits.
2.
ienied.

Defendant Ron Dreitzler's Motion for Attorney's Fees is

3.

Plaintiff's Motions in Limine are rendered moot and/or

denied by implication based upon the Court's granting defendants
_^p

Motions for Summary Judgment.

DATED this

J^^'

Xjl^Jf

day of

199

BY THE^COURT,

IORABLE TYRONE E. MEDj
'.CT COURT JUDGE

MI\E:\Clicnc\ WcrncrsXOrdcr rc.MSJ
W158.00
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| U f l DISTRICT CO'JRJ
Third Judicial District
FEB 2 2 1999

LAW OFFICES OF PHILLIP W. OYER
PHILLIP W. DYER (4315)
KEVIN C. TIMKEN (300 3)
Attorneys for Defendants
221 Kearns Building
136 South Mair. Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84 10 1
(301)363-5000
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, DIVISION I
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THOMAS D. HARRISON,
Plaintiff,

)
)

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW re:

)
)

DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.
RON DREITZLER and WERNER'S
MERCEDES REPAIR, Inc.,

;
)

Defendants.

)

Civil No. 93-0900524 CN
Judge Tyrone E. Medley
Defendant Ron Dreitzler's Motion for Summary Judgment and
for Award of Attorney's Fees, Defendant Werner's Mercedes Repair,
Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment, and Plaintiff Thomas D.
Harrison's First, Third, and Fourth Motions in Limine came on for
hearing before the Honorable Judge Tyrone E. Medley on the 5""
day of October, 1993, at the hour of 3:3C a.m., the Plaintiff
appearing by and through his counsel, Robert B. Hansen and the
Defendants appearing by and through their counsel, Phillip w.
Dyer.

The Court heard oral argument from Messrs. Dyer and

Hansen, requested supplementary briefing or. the issue of part

performance, took the motions under advisement, having received
and reviewed briefing by counsel on -he issue of part performance
and issued its Minute Entry on the 29'n Day of October, 1993, the
Court hereby enters its
FINDINGS Or FACT
A3 to Defendant Dreitzler's Motion for Summary Judcrment:
1.

On or about January 16, 1998, plaintiff filed his

original Complaint in this matter seeking to enforce an alleged
oral agreement between plaintiff and Defendant Dreitzler whereby
Dreitzler allegedly agreed to indemnify plaintiff as to a bank
loan with Draper 3ank and Trust.

That Complaint was asserted

against Defendant Dreitzler individually and not against Werner's
Mercedes Repair, Inc.
2.

Plaintiff's loan with Draper 3ank and Trust was in the

amount of $14,000,00 and was secured by a 1987 Mercedes
automobile plaintiff has claimed was traded to defendants.
3.

On or about October 31, 1997, plaintiff entered into a

Change in Terms agreement with Draper Bank and Trust wherein
plaintiff agreed to pay the $14,000.00 loan over a period of two
years.
4.

The loan remained secured by the 1937 Mercedes.
On March 31, 1993, Defendant Dreitzler retained Phillip

W. Dyer to represent him in this matter.
1993, Mr. Dyer

On or about April 10,

filed a Motion to Amend seeking to assert an
9

Amended Answer that included an affirmative defense (among many
others) that any alleged agreement was solely between plaintiff
and Werner's Mercedes Repair, Inc., a Utah Corporation in good
standing.
5.

On May 13, 1993, Plaintiff's deposition was taken.

At

that time plaintiff produced two (2) items of correspondence from
plaintiff which were addressed to Werner's Mercedes Repair, inc.
Both letters pre-date the filing of the Complaint, were copied to
plaintiff's counsel, and are addressed to the corporate
defendant, Werner's Mercedes Repair, Inc.
6.

In his deposition, plaintiff testified that he was aware

he was dealing with a corporate entity (i.e., Werner's) and not
with Dreitzler individually,
7.

In his deposition, plaintiff testified that he

understood the distinction between a corporation and an
individual,
8.

On May 26, 1998, prior to filing Plaintiff's Amended

Complaint, Plaintiff's counsel moved to dismiss Defendant
Dreitzler as being improperly joined as a party defendant.

On

June 3, 1993, Defendant Dreitzler requested attorney's fees in
his Memorandum Regarding Plaintiff's Motion for Dismissal of
Defendant Ron Dreitzler.- On June 22, 1993, Plaintiff's counsel
withdrew his Motion to Dismiss Defendant Dreitzler.
3

9.

Defendant Dreitsier has expended several thousand

dollars defending this matter to date.
As to Defendant Werner's Mercedes Repair, Inc.'5 Motion for
Summary Judgment:
1.

Plaintiff and Defendant Werner's signed a Motor Vehicle

Contract of Sale dated August 1, 1997, which listed a 1987
Mercedes under the heading "Trade-in and/or Other Credits."
2.

Plaintiff's deposition testimony was that the Motor

Vehicle Contract of Sale did not reflect the complete agreement
of the parties.
3-

The 1987 Mercedes at issue in this case was never traded

to defendant Werner's but was taken by Werner's on a consignment
basis.
4.

In his deposition testimony, Plaintiff admitted that the

title to x;he 1987 Mercedes was never transferred to defendant
Werner's as it would have been if the vehicle had in fact been
traded to Werner's.
5.

After the date of the contract, plaintiff's actions were

inconsistent with any possibility that the 1987 Mercedes was a
"trade-in":
a) On July 23, 1997, plaintiff entered into a loan
agreement with Draper 3ank. and Trust.

Plaintiff borrowed

$14,000.00; the loan was secured in part by the 1937 Mercedes at
issue m

this case.

The documents indicate that the primary
4

source of repayment was to be Mr. Harrison's personal income.
Werner's was nor a party to this loan agreement.
b) On October 31,

1997, plaintiff entered into a Change

of Terms Agreement with Draper Bank and Trust.

The loan remained

secured in part by the 1937 Mercedes at issue in this case.
Werner's was not a party to this Change in Terms Agreement.
c) On July 28, 1997, plaintiff executed a Power of
Attorney in favor of Draper Bank and Trust in which he averred
that he is the "bona fide registered owner of the following
described motor vehicle:
6.

1987 Mercedes Benz 300 SDL".

Deposition testimony of the loan officer at Draper Bank

and Trust revealed that neither defendants, nor Draper Bank and
Trust, ever treated anyone but plaintiff as the owner of the 1987
Mercedes.
The Court having entered its Findings of Fact, now hereby
makes the following
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
As to Defendant Dreitzlerrs Motion for Summary Judgment:
1.

Plaintiff's claim alleging an oral agreement to

indemnify is barred by the statute of frauds.

Specifically, the

claim is barred both by Uzah Code Ann. § 25-5-4(2) (1993), which
applies to any "promise to answer for the debt, default, or
miscarriage of another" and by § 25-5-4(1) (1993), which applies
5

co "every agreement that by its terns is no: to be performed
within one year."

Further, plaintiff's claim is not taken out of

the statute of frauds by any part performance tor two reasons.
First, the part performance doctrine is only available where the
statute of frauds is asserted as a defense in a specific
performance action involving real property or unique personalty.
Second,

even if the doctrine of part performance were available

to plaintiff, plaintiff has not provided the Court with clear and
convincing evidence showing that any alleged part performance is
exclusively referable to the alleged oral agreement.
As to Defendant Werner's Mercedes Repair, Inc.15 Motion for
Summary Judgment:
1.

The contract before the Court is not fully integrated

and the Court must therefore turn to parol evidence to determine
the intent of the parties.

Based on the parol evidence, it is

clear that as a matter of law, the 1987 Mercedes was not traded
in to defendants but has been owned by plaintiff at ail times
relevant to this matter.
DATED this

2^^

day of fTf Os^^

, 199^

ONORABLE TYRONE E
7 COURT JUDGE
Ml ii. Clic::: '.V-rncr; fir.Jir.£> }t ? 1:1
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
STATE OF UTAH

)

)ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Phillip W. Dyer being duly sworn, deposes and says:
served

That he

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO

APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION

upon the following

parties by placing a true and correct copy thereof in an envelope
addressed to:
Robert B. Hansen, Esq.
838 18th Avenue
Salt Lake City, Utah

84103

and mailing the same, sealed, in the United States Postal
Service, first class postage prepaid thereon, at Salt Lake City,
Utah, on the

9*

day of

if-

/i^-yr^/

, 1999.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN t o b e f o r e me t h i s

tQl-9t

, 1999.

7^S sL.

day o f

,

\

My Cpmmission expires:

\D\^nc\

NOTARY PUBLld!

.arv Public
\
Notary
0
Residing at:
Salt Lake County, Utah
|

:-*.\ Kathleen J. Gm-?n-sa
" >\
: i

^ClP^y
Sij**^

«2«5£o. ••>!:•: C>., No. $** J
C-;t L d ^ - "•; Vi-.?I 0*101

" Decomb3f 2'3. 1 &9
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TH!WD/STS^

COURT
Third Judicial District

JUL i 4 MS
fly.

LAW OFFICES OF PHILLIP W. DYER
PHILLIP W. DYER (4315)
KEVIN C. TIMKEN (8003)
Attorneys for Defendants
221 Kearns Building
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

ENTERED IN REGISTRY
Or J U D 3 i ^ l S
DATE

(801)363-5000

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, DIVISION I
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT
WERNERrS MERCEDES REPAIR,
INC.'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT, DENYING WERNER'S
MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES

THOMAS D. HARRISON,
Plaintiff,
vs,

and
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF WERNER'S
AND AGAINST THOMAS HARRISON

RON DREITZLER and WERNER'S
MERCEDES REPAIR, Inc.,

Civil No. 98-0900524 CN

Defendants,

Judge Tyrone E. Medley
ORDER
Based upon the memoranda of the parties, the Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law heretofore entered, and good cause
appearing therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
1.

Defendant Werner's Mercedes Repair, inc.'s (Werner's),

Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.
2.

Defendant Werner's Motion for Attorneyrs Fees is denied.

3.

Judgment is granted in favor of Werner's Mercedes

Repair, Inc., and against Thomas Harrison in the sum of $878.16.
Interest shall accrue on the unpaid amount of the judgment at the
judgment rate of 6.513%,
AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT THIS JUDGMENT SHALL BE
AUGMENTED IN THE AMOUNT OF REASONABLE COSTS EXPENDED IN
COLLECTING SAID JUDGMENT BY EXECUTION OR OTHERWISE AS SHALL BE
ESTABLISHED BY AFFIDAVIT.

DATED this

M

day of

VI^^X

1999,

IONORABLE TYRONE E/ MEDLEY
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

MI\E:\ClJer.r\Wern«5\OTdcrrc:MSJ2
W158.00
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LAW OFFICES OF PHILLIP W. DYER
PHILLIP W. DYER (4315)
KEVIN C. TIMKEN (8003)
Attorneys for Defendants
221 Kearns Building
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
(801)363-5000
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, DIVISION I
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THOMAS D. HARRISON,
Plaintiff,
vs.

> FINDINGS OF FACT AND
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW re:
> DEFENDANT WERNER'S MERCEDES
) REPAIR, INC.'S, MOTION FOR
,) SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND MOTION
) FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES

RON DREITZLER and WERNER'S
MERCEDES REPAIR, Inc.,

j
)

Defendants.

)

Civil No. 98-0900524 CN
Judge Tyrone E. Medley
Defendant Werner's Mercedes Repair, inc.'s (Werner's) Motion
for Summary Judgment and Motion for Attorneys Fees were
submitted for decision pursuant to Notices to Submit for Decision
dated April 19, 1999,

The Court having reviewed Werner's Motion

for Summary Judgment, Werner's Memorandum of Points and
Authorities in Support of that Motion, Plaintiff's Memorandum of
Points and Authorities in Opposition to that Motion, and Werner's
Reply Memorandum in Further Supporr of that Motion, as well as
Werner's Motion for Attorney's Fees and Werner's Memorandum of
Points and Authorities in Support of that Motion, issued a Minute

CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
STATE OF UTAH

)
)SS.

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Kathleen J. Gillman being duly sworn, deposes and says:
That she served

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT WERNER'S MERCEDES

REPAIR, INC.'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, DENYING WERNER1S
MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES and JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF WERNERS AND
AGAINST THOMAS HARRISON

upon the following party by placing a

true and correct copy in an envelope addressed to:
Robert B. Hansen, Esq.
838 18th Avenue
Salt Lake City, Utah
and causing the same, sealed, to be hand delivered on the
day of

ALt-M7

1999.

SUBSCRIBED
JBSCRIBED AND SWORN to be:
before me this

J/P

day of

Notary Public
Residing at
Salt Lake County, Utah

My Commission expires:
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STATE OF UTAH _„ I

Entry dated April 29, 1999, regarding the Defendant's pending
motions and good cause appearing therefor, the Court hereby makes
and enters its
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Plaintiff and Defendant Werner's signed a Motor Vehicle

Contract of Sale dated August 1, 1997, which listed a 1987
Mercedes under the heading "Trade-in and/or Other Credits."
2.

Plaintiff's deposition testimony was that the Motor

Vehicle Contract of Sale did not reflect the complete agreement
of the parties*
3.

The 1987 Mercedes at issue in this case was never

traded-in by Plaintiff to defendant Werner's but was taken by
Werner's on a consignment basis.
4.

In his deposition testimony, plaintiff admitted that the

title to the 1987 Mercedes was never transferred to defendant
Werner's as it would have been if the vehicle had, in fact, been
traded to Werner's.
5.

After the date of the contract, plaintiff's actions were

inconsistent with any possibility that the 1987 Mercedes was a
"trade-in" :
a) On July 28, 1997, plaintiff entered into a loan
agreement with Draper Bank and Trust.

Plaintiff borrowed

$14,000.00; the loan was secured in part by the 1987 Mercedes at
2

issue in this case.

The documents indicate that the primary

source of repayment was to be Mr. Harrison's personal income.
Werner's was not a party to this loan agreement.
b) On October 31, 1997, plaintiff entered into a Change
of Terms Agreement with Draper Bank and Trust.

The loan remained

secured in part by the 1987 Mercedes at issue in this case.
Werner's was not a party to this Change in Terms Agreement.
c) On July 28, 1997, plaintiff executed a Power of
Attorney in favor of Draper Bank and Trust in which he averred
that he is the "bona fide registered owner of the following
described motor vehicle:
6.

1987 Mercedes Benz 300 SDL".

Deposition testimony of the loan officer at Draper Bank

and Trust, one Patty Householder, revealed that neither
defendants, nor Draper Bank and Trust, has ever treated anyone
but plaintiff as the owner of the 1987 Mercedes.
7.

When the 1987 Mercedes did not sell on a consignment

basis, the sum of $878.16 in additional sales tax became due
incident to Plaintiff's purchase of the 19 91 Mercedes.

Defendant

Werner's was required to pay that additional sales tax on
Plaintiff's behalf and is entitled to reimbursement for the sales
taxes paid but owed by Plaintiff incident to Plaintiff's purchase
of the 1991 Mercedes.
8.

Despite the fact that the Court was unable to locate a
3

timely filed Memorandum in Opposition, the Court cannot find that
Plaintiff's defense on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment
was without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith.
The Court having entered its Findings of Fact, now hereby
makes the following
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The contract before the Court is not fully integrated

and the Court must therefore turn to parol evidence to determine
the intent of the parties.

Based on the parol evidence, it is

clear that as a matter of law, the 1987 Mercedes was not traded
in to defendants but has been owned by plaintiff at all times
relevant to this matter.
2-

Because Werner's was forced to pay ?878.16 in additional

sales, tax owed by Plaintiff incident to the purchase of the 1991
Mercedes, Defendant Werner's is entitled to judgment against
Plaintiff in the amount of $878.16.
3.

Defendant Werner's Motion for Attorneyrs Fees should be

denied.

DATED this

I I

day of S4 l / ^V

1999

IE HONORABLE TYRO'
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
MI\£.\Ciient\ Werners \ Findings of Fact 2/W153 00
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states that he served

BRIEF OF

APPELLEE RON DREITZLER AND WERNER'S MERCEDES REPAIR, INC.

upon

the following parties by placing two (2) true and correct copies
thereof in an envelope addressed to:
ROBERT B. HANSEN, ESQ.
838 18 TH Avenue
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
and mailing the same, sealed, with first class postage prepaid
thereon, in the United States Mail at Salt Lake City, Utah, on
the

(PS

day of

, 2000.

>hillip W. Dyer, Esq.
Kevin C. Timken, Esq.
Attorneys for Dreitzler
Werner * s

and

